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Abstract
Little research has examined why the European Commission is so hesitant in opening an
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) against EU member states with deficit and debt levels
that violate the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In order to explain this, I argue that
the European Commission can be classified as a non-majoritarian institution (NMI) that
lacks direct legitimization via elections and complete information about the nature of non-
compliance. When sanctioning elected governments, it therefore has to rely on voters’ sup-
port for compliance with the SGP and a sufficient amount of transparency about the coun-
try’s economic situation. In order to test this argument empirically, I present a Bayesian
multi-level probit model as a new method for analyzing small N panel-heteroskedastic and
contemporaneously correlated binary time-series cross-sectional (BTSCS) data and test its
compared with existing methods. I find evidence for the suitability of the Bayesian mul-
tilevel probit model for modeling BTSCS characteristics, but not for the effect of strong
public support and transparency on the Commission’s EDP initiations. My contributions
are therefore theoretical, empirical and methodological. Theoretically, I combine arguments
from European Union research and judicial politics on NMI decision-making to explain the
sanctioning of SGP violations by the European Commission. Empirically, I conduct the
first quantitative analysis to test these arguments and assess the determinants of the Eu-
ropean Commission’s sanctioning behavior. Methodologically, I provide researchers with
an alternative technique for BTSCS data analysis.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal discipline is increasingly monitored by supranational and/or national independent
agencies (Bova et al. 2015). These monitoring institutions – like central banks and consti-
tutional courts – can be referred to as NMIs, namely “[..] governmental entities that [...]
possess and exercise some grant of specialised public authority, separate from that of other
institutions, but [...] are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by
elected officials” (Thatcher and Sweet 2002, 2).
Surprisingly, despite fiscal surveillance of NMIs, rising levels of budget deficits and
public debt around the world can be observed (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010; Reinhart et al.
2012; Roubini and Sachs 1989; Alesina et al. 1999; Bova et al. 2015; Grilli et al. 1991).
The most prominent case of the failure of non–majoritarian monitoring of fiscal policy
is the “Stability and Growth Pact” (SGP) of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
of the European Union (EU) (Buti and Carnot 2012, 899–900). The fiscal surveillance
framework outlined by the pact includes the so–called “corrective arm”, where the Eu-
ropean Commission is responsible for sanctioning a government that violates the pact’s
deficit and debt reference values by opening an EDP in order to enforce a balanced budget
(Buti and Carnot 2012, 900; European Commission 2017d; Köhler et al. 2018, 1–2; Baerg
and Hallerberg 2016, 970–973). In the context of the SGP, the European Commission
functions as the EU’s non–majoritarian central monitoring agency for fiscal policy and it
serves as a “watchdog” for compliance with the fiscal rules of the Maastricht treaty (Baerg
and Hallerberg 2016, 968–972; Köhler et al. 2018, 9; König and Mäder 2014; van der Veer
and Haverland 2018, 2).
The conditions when the Commission should initiate an EDP are clearly defined: the
pact prohibits the breach of the reference values of a 3% deficit of GDP and a debt burden
of 60 % of GDP (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016, 968–972; Köhler et al. 2018, 9; König and
Mäder 2014; van der Veer and Haverland 2018, 2). However, despite these clear criteria,
the effectiveness of the SGP in general and the sanctioning behavior of the Commission in
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particular has been called into question in the face of highly indebted Eurozone member
states and the recent European sovereign debt crisis (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016; Fabbrini
2013; King and Bouvet 2011; Howarth 2004; Köhler and König 2015; van der Veer and
Haverland 2018). This raises the question of how the lenient sanctioning of the European
Commission and consequently the ineffectiveness of the SGP can be explained.
Both economists and political scientists have investigated the determinants of deficit
and debt accumulation and institutional solutions that are able to prevent this problem
(Alesina and Perotti 1995; Alesina et al. 1999; Annett 2001; Barro 1979; Buchanan and
Wagner 1977; Cukierman and Meltzer 1989; De Haan and Sturm 1994; Grilli et al. 1991;
Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999; Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999; Rodden 2002; Roubini
and Sachs 1989; Tabellini 1991; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Persson and Svensson 1989;
Velasco 2000; von Hagen and Harden 1995; von Hagen 2002; von Hagen 2006; Wibbels
2000; Weingast et al. 1981).
However, most of this literature focuses on domestic factors and does not consider
supranational factors such as the monitoring of fiscal policy by the Commission under the
SGP. In turn, the existing literature on the SGP mainly concentrates on limitations in
the institutional design of the pact that further a violation of the SGP’s deficit and debt
criteria and consequently limit its effectiveness (Annett 2006; Köhler and König 2015;
Irlenbusch et al. 2003; von Hagen and Wolff 2006). Accordingly, this research ignores the
role of the European Commission to sanction rule breaking in a timely manner to maintain
the functioning of the SGP. Regarding the Commission, the occurrence of the European
sovereign debt crisis showed that the economic criteria as outlined in the pact do not seem
to be exclusively decisive for the Commission initiating an EDP.
The literature focusing on Commission behavior identifies the influence of powerful
member states on the sanctioning procedure at the EU level as an important determinant
for the Commission’s hesitant sanctioning (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016; Eichengreen 2005;
De Haan et al. 2004; Heipertz and Verdun 2010). The problem is that this explanation
exclusively focuses at the European level and ignores determinants at the member state
level.
In contrast to these previous explanations, I argue that the Commission suffers from a
legitimacy and a transparency problem which affects its decision to sanction overspending
governments. On the one hand, as an NMI, the Commission lacks direct electoral legit-
imization and therefore needs to consider voters’ support for itself when sanctioning elected
member state governments (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 695; Köhler et al. 2018, 11–15;
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Stéclebout-Orseau and Hallerberg 2007, 10–22; Thatcher and Sweet 2002, 1–2; Vanberg
2001, 347; Vanberg 2005, 20–24). In order to compensate for this lack of legitimization via
direct elections, it relies on voters’ support at the member state level: only when the public
supports the European Commission and the rules of the SGP does the Commission have
sufficient political power to open an EDP against a non–compliant member state (Köhler
et al. 2018, 11–15; Vanberg 2001, 347; Vanberg 2005, 19–24).
On the other hand, the Commission acts under uncertainty when sanctioning mem-
ber state governments since it has no information about whether excessive fiscal policy
is justified – for example, in the occurrence of a sudden economic crisis – or‚ caused by
serving voters’ consumptive interest with high amounts of public spending (Köhler et al.
2018, 14–19). In order to avoid antagonizing voters via an unjustified EDP initiation –
which would endanger the Commission’s future legitimacy – it is crucial for the Commis-
sion to make the appropriate decision about whether the government’s overspending is due
to responsiveness (Köhler et al. 2018, 14–15). A possible solution for the Commission’s
dilemma is increased transparency: from judicial politics, it is known that courts need
a transparent political system so that the public can detect government non–compliance
(Köhler et al. 2018, 14–15; Vanberg 2005, 19–49). However, in contrast to a court, I argue
that the Commission is in need of transparency about the country’s economic situation
to identify whether an EDP initiation is appropriate. In this regard, the absence of an
economic crisis indicates a responsive government which justifies an EDP initiation with-
out undermining the Commission’s legitimacy. Consequently, the Commission will only
sanction SGP violations via an EDP if its underlying problems of insufficient legitimacy
and transparency are solved.
I test the effect of these two factors on EDP initiations on a data for twenty-five
EU–members, all of which violated the pact during the period 2002 to 2017. By com-
prising repeated observations across different countries, a binary dependent variable and a
low number of countries and years, the data for this investigation can be classified as binary
time–series cross–sectional (BTSCS) data (Beck et al. 1998; Beck 2001a, 111–273; Beck
2001b, 271; Beck and Katz 2007, 183). Analyzing this data bears a number of method-
ological challenges, such as dealing with the presence of contemporaneous correlation and
panel heteroskedasticity in a small sample, which can lead to incorrect standard errors
and even biased estimates in logit or probit models (Beck and Katz 1995, 636; Beck et al.
1998, 1261–1263; Beck 2001a, 118–130; Beck 2001b, 275–288; Shor et al. 2007, 165–172;
Yatchew and Griliches 1985, 135–137). Unfortunately, standard methods for BTSCS in-
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vestigations such as the temporal dummy approach proposed by Beck et al. (1998) or
multi–level models including country–level intercepts ignore either panel heteroskedastic-
ity or contemporaneous correlation (Beck et al. 1998, 1261–1283; Beck 2001a; Beck 2001b;
Fahrmeir et al. 2013; Gelman and Hill 2006; Hedeker and Gibbons 2006). A promising al-
ternative are Bayesian multi–level models that have been extended by a year–level random
intercept, thereby accounting for panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correla-
tion at the same time, while resulting in correct standard errors even for samples with few
countries (Pang 2010; Shor et al. 2007; Stegmüller 2013). Since evidence on the perfor-
mance of this alternative to standard techniques is limited for nonlinear models, I assess
the performance of a Bayesian multi–level probit (BMLP BTSCS) model with a country–
and year–specific random intercept compared with the performance of five other models
used for BTSCS data analysis – including Beck et al.’s (1998) BTSCS standard approach
and frequentist multi–level probit models – in a Montel Carlo experiment. I find that the
model yields unbiased estimates and correct standard errors even for small sample sizes
with 10 ≤ N ≤ 30, which makes it an appropriate technique for estimating the effect of
public support and transparency on the initiation of EDPs by the European Commission.
The results of the analysis indicate that EDP openings by the European Commission is
not unambiguously influenced by both public support and transparency: high levels of both
factors do not increase the probability of EDP initiations in case of non–compliance with the
SGP in all model specifications and the uncertainty of the results is high. Nevertheless, the
results hint at a “democratic deficit” of the Commission, resulting from its lack of legitimacy
as one reason for the ineffectiveness of the SGP, as it induces a strategic sanctioning
behavior of the Commission (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002).
The contribution of this research is threefold: First, it adds to the body of literature
on explaining SGP (in)effectiveness by combining theoretical arguments from EU research
and judicial politics on the strategic nature of NMI decision–making. In this regard, I
identify the lack of legitimacy and transparency as key determinants of the malfunctioning
of non–majoritarian fiscal surveillance in the EU. Second, by testing the effect of public
support and transparency on EDP initiations by the Commission in a quantitative anal-
ysis, I offer the first study providing an empirical assessment of the determinants of NMI
decision–making in the context of the SGP. Third, the research contributes to the method-
ological literature on BTSCS analysis by addressing the methodological question of which
model is most appropriate for small N BTSCS data.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. First, I begin with an overview
4
of the political economy of deficit– and debt–making, as well as the existing national
institutional solutions to this problem. I then continue with a more specific literature
review on the effectiveness of the SGP and non–majoritarian economic governance within
the EMU.
In the second part, I present and discuss the theoretical models that attempt to explain
NMI decision–making and combine their predictions to explain the Commission’s decision
making process when initiating EDPs.
Subsequently, I discuss the methodological challenges of European Union research in the
third section. Here, I also describe the research design including the data and the method
to be used as well as the operationalization of the variables included in the statistical model.
Moreover, I explain the characteristics of BTSCS data and methodological solutions for
dealing with them in further detail. Finally, I present the Monte Carlo experiment with
the goal of finding the best method for assessing the determinants of EDP initiations by
the European Commission.
Having determined the model to be chosen for the analysis, the fifth section includes
some descriptive statistics and the results of the analysis. Finally, these results and their
implications are summarized and discussed in the conclusion.
5
2 Why do states overspend?
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Figure 1: Budget Deficits of OECD Countries since 1980
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Figure 2: Debt Levels of OECD Countries since 1980
Figures 1 and 2 1) show the net lending/borrowing rate and general government gross
debt as a percentage of GDP of all OECD countries from 1980 to 2017. The graphs
show two interesting developments: First, the net lending/borrowing rate is below zero
for most OECD countries, which indicates a budget deficit. Moreover, we also observe
an increasing trend for many OECD countries in terms of debt. However, second, there
remains considerable variation across these countries: for example, while Norway runs a
surplus, Ireland experienced a deep deficit. The same is true for debt levels, with Japan
running the highest debt level and Denmark maintaining the lowest amount of debt. High
deficits and debt levels thus do not seem to be an exclusively European phenomenon.
The graphs lead to two questions: Why do so many countries accumulate high deficit
and debt levels? What explains the variation in deficit and debt levels across countries?
Both economists and political scientists have attempted to answer this question with dif-
ferent explanations.
A starting point is the so–called “tax–smoothing” model, which assumes that the gov-
ernment is a unitary actor that acts like a “benevolent social planner” seeking to maximize
the utility of the “representative agent”, namely the people (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 4–5;
Barro 1979; Lucas Jr and Stokey 1983). Since taxes rate should be kept constant and taxes
1Figures 3 and 4 have been created using the R–packages dplyr, gdata, ggplot2 and
foreign (R Core Team 2015; Warnes et al. 2017; Wickham 2016; Wickham et al. 2017).
Data are obtained from the IMF database (International Monetary Fund 2019b; Interna-
tional Monetary Fund 2019a).
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are determined by the intertemporal budget constraint – which postulates that the present
value of spending needs to be equal to the present value of spending – budget deficits are
used as a “buffer” given that deficits occur when spending is temporarily high (due to
e.g. economic shocks or – in former times – war), while surpluses occur when spending
is low (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 6–7; Barro 1979, 940–943; Lucas Jr and Stokey 1983,
99). Barro (1979) finds evidence for the tax–smoothing model, given that debt increases
as expected during wartime such as the Korean and Vietnam War and recessions (Barro
1979, 960–969).
The tax–smoothing model provides a purely economic explanation for deficit and debt
accumulation, but leaves the question of why some countries maintain higher deficit and/or
debt levels than others unanswered (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 9–10). While OECD coun-
tries are very similar economically as they are all developed countries, they vary in their
political characteristics. Thus, scholars have deviated from an exclusively economic ap-
proach and moved towards political–economic explanations that relax the unitary actor
assumption of the government and focus more on the relation between governments and
voters.
The first political–economic approach is models based on the idea of “fiscal illusion”
(Alesina and Perotti 1995, 10; Buchanan and Wagner 1977, 133–134). The key argu-
ment is that a complex taxation system prompts voters to underestimate the true costs
of public goods and services and therefore demand higher levels of them (Buchanan and
Wagner 1977, 131–136). At the same time, office–seeking politicians have the opportunity
to finance voters’ demand by debt, which further increases both the misperception of the
costs of public goods and services and their demand (Buchanan and Wagner 1977, 144).
As politicians’ incentive to raise taxes is very low in such a situation, the result are high
deficit and debt burdens (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 11;Buchanan and Wagner 1977, 144).
The fiscal illusion approach is related to the literature on “political business cycles”,
which predicts pre–electoral expansionary policies followed by recessions (Alesina and Per-
otti 1995, 13; Nordhaus 1975). Even though the original political business cycle model
developed by Nordhaus (1975) focused on monetary policy and its inherent inflation/unem-
ployment trade–off, its logic also applies to fiscal policy given that we will observe budget
deficits before an election (Alesina et al. 1993, 16; Alesina and Perotti 1995, 13; Alt and
Lassen 2006; Nordhaus 1975). However, the empirical evidence on fiscal political business
cycles is mixed and seems to depend on third factors such as the transparency and po-
larization of the political system (Alesina et al. 1993; Alt and Lassen 2006). Besides the
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mixed empirical evidence, it is unclear why voters should always be biased in the same
way – namely overestimating benefit and underestimating tax burden – and not the other
way round: it is also possible that voters discard useful long–term investments that are
expected to bring high revenues because they overestimate their costs (Alesina and Per-
otti 1995, 11). Moreover, this model is also unable to explain cross–country differences in
democracies, where in theory all voters should be fiscally biased in the same way (Alesina
and Perotti 1995, 12).
While the fiscal illusion approach focuses on the relationship between voters and gov-
ernments to explain deficit– and debt–making, models of intergenerational redistribution
concentrate on the relationship between generations of voters (Alesina and Perotti 1995,
13). This category of models relaxes the principle of “Ricardian equivalence”, which states
that the distribution of tax burden is independent from debt because changes in the amount
of public debt are compensated by changes in private bequests given a sufficient amount
of altruism (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 13–14). If this principle no longer holds, it leads to
the intergenerational redistribution of debt as the current generation – which is eligible to
vote at time t – transfers the debt burden to the future generation who are not yet allowed
to vote (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 14).
Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) argue that the Ricardian equivalence is unlikely to hold
for all voters as they have different abilities and will in leaving bequests that compensate
future tax burdens (Cukierman and Meltzer 1989, 713). Some voters even prefer to run
budget deficits to increase their own consumption and therefore leave negative bequests
(Cukierman and Meltzer 1989, 713). Consequently, the debt accumulation of a nation
reflects the number of people – and the majority of voters – who are leaving negative
bequests (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 15; Cukierman and Meltzer 1989, 730).
Intergenerational redistribution is a feasible strategy because future generations will
repay the debt issued by former generations, given that they were unable to vote at the
time when the debt was issued and repudiating it would harm not only the old but also the
wealthy (Tabellini 1991, 336). To avoid this, there will always be a fraction of young voters
who are rather in favor of repaying debt, which makes it possible that former generations
are able to transfer their debt to subsequent generations (Tabellini 1991, 336).
While these theories are able to explain the reasons for debt accumulation, the question
about the reasons for cross–country variation remains unanswered by these theories, as
this would imply that intergenerational altruism is stronger in some countries than others
(Alesina and Perotti 1995, 15).
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Instead of concentrating on the voter level, models that regard debt as a strategic
variable focus on the interaction between consecutive governments (Alesina and Perotti
1995, 16). In these models, governments issue debt as a strategic means to restrict the acts
of succeeding governments (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 16–22).
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) relax the assumption of a benevolent social planner by
Barro (1979), and model the interaction between alternating policymakers with different
preferences about the composition of public spending resulting from elections (Alesina and
Tabellini 1990, 403–412). If each of these policymakers uses debt to strategically constrain
their successor, high political polarization leads to an accumulation of debt that is higher
than socially optimal (Alesina and Tabellini 1990, 404).
Somewhat relatedly, Persson and Svensson (1989) also focus on alternating policymak-
ers (a conservative government and a liberal government), although in contrast to Alesina
and Tabellini (1990) these two policymakers have different preferences about the level
rather than the composition of public spending (Alesina and Tabellini 1990, 412; Pers-
son and Svensson 1989, 325–340). They find that a conservative government – knowing
that it will be replaced by a liberal one – will leave a higher amount of public debt to its
successor, thereby constraining the latter’s level of spending (Persson and Svensson 1989,
339–341). While the budget deficit of the Reagan administration can be explained by this
theory, it also introduces the amount of political polarization and political competition
which are able to explain cross–country variation (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 21–22; Pers-
son and Svensson 1989, 326). These two factors play a stronger role in the next class of
models of distributional conflicts within social groups and/or coalition partners and models
of geographically–dispersed interests (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 5).
In these models, deficit and debt accumulation is a result of intragovernmental (for
example, among coalition partners) rather than intergovernmental conflict (Alesina and
Perotti 1995, 22). According to Weingast et al. (1981), public decision–making suffers
from an inefficiency bias towards large but inefficient projects, namely projects or grants
from which only specific constituencies benefit (Weingast et al. 1981, 643). This bias stems
from three sources: first, locally–targeted expenditures are only seen as benefits by the
respective local constituency (Weingast et al. 1981, 658); second, the existence of separate
districts whereby only one specific constituency benefit from a project combined with
general taxation that distributes the costs of this given projects across all constituencies
incentivizes policymakers to increase a project to an inefficient size as the link between
beneficiaries and revenue sources is weakened (Weingast et al. 1981, 643–658); and finally,
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the previous two sources of inefficiency remain because they maximize total political net
benefits (Weingast et al. 1981, 657–658).
The “common–pool problem of public finances” is related to the model of Weingast
et al. (1991) (von Hagen 2002, 263–264; von Hagen 2006, 464–465). The common–pool
problem arises in a situation where politicians have access to a general tax fund from which
they can spend money on some target group (von Hagen 2006, 465). The main problem
of this situation is that the net beneficiaries of this spending are often small for the whole
society, as the target group is usually much smaller than the group of taxpayers (von Hagen
2006, 465). As a result, these groups and politicians representing them ask for increasingly
more spending on policies that are mainly in their interest, but not in the interest of society
as a whole (von Hagen 2006, 465). It is exactly this dynamic via which the common–pool
problem leads to high deficit and debt levels (von Hagen 2006, 465).
The common–pool problem’s negative effect on deficit and debt levels is intensified by
the number of politicians who have access to the tax fund, ideological and/or ethnical
and vertical fiscal division, which has been well confirmed empirically (Annett 2001, 561;
De Haan and Sturm 1994; Grilli et al. 1991; Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999; Rodden 2002,
675–682; Roubini and Sachs 1989); Velasco 2000; von Hagen 2006, 465;Wibbels 2000,
687–694).
For example, the number of spending ministers (“cabinet size”) (Kontopoulos and Per-
otti 1999, 81–101); coalition size (Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999, 81–101; Roubini and
Sachs 1989, 931), proportional representation with a fragmented party system (Grilli et al.
1991, 349–375), frequent government changes (De Haan and Sturm 1994, 157–161; Roubini
and Sachs 1989, 904–905) and left–wing partisanship (De Haan and Sturm 1994, 157–161)
contribute to higher government spending, deficit and debt levels. Annett (2001) confirms
that ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization increases government consumption, as
this is a necessary means to maintain political stability (Annett 2001, 561–589). Federal-
ism where subfederal units are allowed to borrow money and have a high amount of fiscal
autonomy have also been found to accumulate higher deficits and have higher debt levels
than unitary states where provinces lack these rights (Rodden 2002, 675–682; Wibbels
2000, 687–694).
Since states vary in these political characteristics, models of distributional conflicts
within social groups and/or coalition partners and models of geographically–dispersed in-
terests finally provide an explanation for both the rising high levels of deficit and debt
and the variation across countries in terms of these two economic variables observed in
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Figures1 and 2. However, answering the first two questions leads to a third one that has
not been answered by any of the aforementioned models: What institutional solutions that
can prevent states from accumulating a high deficit and/or a high debt burden?
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3 Institutional Solutions to Prevent
Governmental Overspending
While the reasons for overspending have been identified, the question regarding appropriate
institutional solutions for these problems remains, which is the focus of the final class of
models, models on budgetary institutions (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 5). According to
these models, budget institutions have to fulfill two conditions to be effective: they need
to be difficult to change and they need to influence the final vote and implementation of
the budget (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 32).
To date, the literature identified three institutional solutions that help to mitigate the
common–pool problem on deficit and debt accumulation: first, the establishment of ex–ante
fiscal rules; second, electoral rules that further both competition and accountability; and
third, modifications of the procedures of the budget process (von Hagen 2002, 264–265; von
Hagen 2006, 465).
Ex–ante fiscal rules can take the form of balanced budget constraints, numerical debt
ceilings, and limits on tax and/or spending growth (von Hagen 2006, 466).
Electoral rules that prevent politicians from extracting high rents are characterized
by small district magnitude and plurality rule where individual candidates can be elected
(von Hagen 2006, 468). This is because the focus on individual candidates in such systems
leads to close monitoring of this candidate’s performance, thereby maximizing his/her
accountability (von Hagen 2006, 468).
Budgetary decision–making processes also need to be designed in a way that politicians
take a more comprehensive view of their budgetary decisions in terms of the costs and
benefits to society as a whole – rather than only their constituencies – as highlighted
by Weingast et al. (1981) – in order to effectively reduce budget deficits and debt (von
Hagen 2006, 470; (Weingast et al. 1981). A budgetary process that is both centralized
and transparent achieves this goal: centralization means that all conflicts regarding the
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budget are solved within this process, while transparency requires comprehensive budget
documents and clear attribution of expenditures (von Hagen 2006, 470).
In contrast to the unambiguous concept of transparency, centralization can usually be
achieved by either delegation or contracts (von Hagen 2006, 471). Delegation means that
one agent – typically the finance minister – sets the rules for the budget and enforces them
against (over)spending ministers (von Hagen 2006, 471). Contracts usually refer to the
situation in which all members of the executive agree on a fixed set of fiscal targets (von
Hagen 2006, 471).
The effectiveness of each of these three measures has been confirmed by empirical stud-
ies: hierarchical budgetary processes with fiscal targets, a strong position of the finance
minister, limits on amendments in the parliamentary process, item–by–item votes on ex-
penditures, the decision on a fixed budget by the parliament previous to the debate, a
highly transparent budget and limited flexibility for spending ministers have been linked
with significantly lower deficit and debt ratios (Alesina et al. 1999, 257–265; von Hagen
and Harden 1995, 776–777).
There is also evidence that the three institutional solutions on limiting budget deficits
are not mutually exclusive. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) argue that the electoral sys-
tem determines the effectiveness of ex ante rules and modifications in the budget process
(Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999, 211). While the delegation approach is can be applied
in plurality electoral systems, parties in coalition governments that exist in proportional
representation systems will be less likely to delegate extensive monitoring and sanction-
ing rights to one minister, particularly if he/she is a member of the other coalition party
(Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999, 211). Instead, negotiated fiscal targets – ideally writ-
ten down in the coalition agreement – are a more appropriate solution for PR systems
(Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999, 211–224). An empirical test of their argument on fifteen
EU states supports their argument, as one–party governments more often choose a delega-
tion approach and multiparty governments the agreement on fiscal targets (Hallerberg and
Von Hagen 1999, 211–212). Moreover, while both the delegation and contract approaches
are effective in limiting budget deficits, the delegation approach is more effective for sin-
gle–party governments and the contract approach for coalition governments (Hallerberg
and Von Hagen 1999, 229–230). This implies that the absence of appropriate institutional
solutions for the prevention of budget deficits rather than the electoral system itself is cru-
cial for fiscal performance (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999, 212). Although a country can
usually hardly change its electoral system, it is nevertheless free to choose the institutional
14
solution that fits its electoral system to prevent overspending.
From the existing literature on institutions that enhance fiscal discipline we have seen
that there exist many solutions whose effectiveness seems to be empirically confirmed.
However, this literature exclusively focuses on domestic solutions, whose implementation
– for example, in case of ex ante budget rules and changes in the budgetary process –
and consequently its effectiveness still lies in the hands of elected politicians. What is
missing in this literature is a fourth solution, namely the supervision of fiscal performance
by supranational NMIs, such as the European Commission’s role in the SGP, as the next
chapter shall discuss in further detail (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016, 968–971; Köhler and
König 2015, 334).
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4 Supranational Non–Majoritarian Fis-
cal Surveillance in the European Union:
Explaining (Non)–Compliance
Figures 3 and 4 1) show the development of deficit and debt levels of all EU countries for
the time period from 2002 to 2017. The development is similar to that of OECD countries
discussed before, as most EU countries maintain high deficit and debt levels. The pattern
is particularly interesting since the time period shown in both figures is one in which the
SGP came into force. Given the accumulation of high deficit and debt levels in many EU
countries and the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis, the question about the
effectiveness of supranational NMI fiscal surveillance in the EU has gained increased interest
(Baerg and Hallerberg 2016; Köhler and König 2015; Köhler et al. 2018; Stéclebout-Orseau
and Hallerberg 2007; van der Veer and Haverland 2018; Wijsman and Crombez 2017).
1Figures 3 and 4 have been created using the R–packages car and ggplot2 (Fox and
Weisberg 2011; Wickham 2016).
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Figure 3: Budget Deficits of EU Countries since 2002
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Figure 4: Debt Levels of EU Countries since 2002
Generally, the SGP and the European Commission as the SGP’s “watchdog” were
intended to serve as European–level institutions to maintain economic stability and con-
vergence within the EU and particularly in the Eurozone (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016,
968–971; Köhler and König 2015, 334).
The purpose of the SGP is to avoid “spillover effects” that could threaten the common
currency (Buti and Giudice 2002, 824; Faini 2006, 446–447). In a currency area such
as the Eurozone, fiscal indiscipline of one member can affect the common interest rate
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and consequently the interest rates and fiscal policies of the other members (Buti and
Giudice 2002, 824; Faini 2006, 446–447). Another problem is that given an expansionary
fiscal policy or extensive public debt, the central bank is no longer able to guarantee price
stability (Buti and Giudice 2002, 824). Furthermore, the SGP was established to avoid the
independent European Central Bank facing pressures from undisciplined member states
(Buti and Giudice 2002, 824–825). For these reasons, the SGP is an essential device to
enhance the functioning of the EMU.
Article 126 and Protocol (No 12) on the EDP annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU) set out the main criteria regarding a) when a rule violation
of the SGP takes place and b) what the Commission is required to do in case of such a
violation (European Union 2008; Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure
2008).
According to Protocol No. 12 on the EDP, the reference values of the SGP are “3% for
the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product at market
prices” and “60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market
prices” (Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure 2008). If a member state’s
deficit and/or debt level exceeds these values, the requirements of the pact are considered as
not fulfilled (European Union 2008). In this case, the Commission is required to prepare
a report considering whether the deficit exceeds government investment expenditure as
well as the member state’s medium–term economic and budgetary situation (European
Union 2008). However, the pact allows for violating the reference values if the deficit ratio
“[...] declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the
reference value,” and the debt ratio “[...] is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the
reference value at a satisfactory pace” (European Union 2008). Moreover, the Commission
is asked to prepare a report if it fears the risk of an excessive deficit in a member state,
even if the deficit and debt criteria are fulfilled (European Union 2008). This report
on the Commission’s opinion of the existence of an excessive deficit is the first step of
the sanctioning process for SGP violations, the so–called “Excessive Deficit Procedure”
(European Central Bank 2003, 59; Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure
2008).
The effectiveness of the SGP as well as the Commission’s ability to enforce member
states to comply with it have been investigated by several studies.
Generally, at the early stages of the EMU, the signing of the Maastricht treaty and
thus the acceptance of its monetary and fiscal convergence criteria led to a reduction of
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deficits in high–deficit countries (Baskaran and Hessami 2017, 254–268). Interestingly, the
deficits in these countries rose once again after the Euro was introduced (Baskaran and
Hessami 2017, 268).
Regarding debt, the effect of the SGP also seems to vary across countries: while the SGP
reduced public debt in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Finland and Austria,
Greece, Portugal and Italy were able to increase their public debt through membership
in the monetary union (Köhler and König 2015, 1–27). This suggests that there exist
free–riding and moral hazard problems within the Eurozone (Köhler and König 2015, 1).
Even worse, von Hagen and Wolff (2006) find that the SGP induced “creative accounting”
to lower deficits among memberstates, thereby leading the purpose of the pact to absurdity
(von Hagen and Wolff 2006, 3259–3261).
The impact of the SGP also seems to depend on domestic characteristics: regarding
the budgetary process, “commitment countries” in which the finance minister has a lead-
ing role in the budgetary decision–making process (such as Finland and the Netherlands)
and “delegation countries”, where different parties agree on a fiscal contract (e.g. France,
Germany, the UK, Italy, Greece, Austria and Spain) show different behavior (Annett 2006,
5–6). “Commitment countries” performed better under the SGP than “delegation coun-
tries” (Annett 2006, 5–26). Furthermore, countries suffering from high growth volatility
and small countries adopted more disciplined fiscal policies under the SGP (Annett 2006,
26).
Another problem is that powerful member states were able to weaken the pact (Baerg
and Hallerberg 2016, 968; Heipertz and Verdun 2010, 149–150). During the first crisis of the
SGP, France and Germany – which had not met its criteria in 2003 – strongly opposed the
pact and its sanctions (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, 129–151). In addition, the indifference
about an enforcement of the pact of the other two large member states, Italy and the UK,
prevented the opening of EDPs against France and Germany, whereby consequently, the
pact was weakened (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, 146–151). This weakening had an effect on
public borrowing within the EU since both high– and low–deficit countries increased their
deficits after the failure to sanction France and Germany (Baskaran and Hessami 2017,
268).
Powerful and Eurosceptic member states were also able to weaken the Commission’s
assessments of fiscal performance, which reduced member states’ commitments to the EU
(Baerg and Hallerberg 2016, 968–971). In addition, the strong bargaining position of the
larger member states who had already violated the pact during its reform in 2005 and
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the lack of enforcement power of the Commission reduced the likelihood of sanctioning
and therefore the effectiveness of the SGP (Eichengreen 2005, 438). However, van der
Veer and Haverland (2018) find that the recent reforms aiming to prevent another “debt
crisis” have strengthened the Commission’s role as a “guardian of the markets” rather
than the “people” (Bauer and Becker 2014, 219; van der Veer and Haverland 2018, 2–16).
This is because higher politicization in member states leads to a) more country–specific
recommendations (CSRs) addressing economic and fiscal risks in a given member state,
and b) fewer recommendations for social investments (Bauer and Becker 2014, 219; van der
Veer and Haverland 2018, 2–16).
Overall, the pact lacks powerful enforcement mechanisms in its institutional design since
the biased Council of Finance Ministers has long been mainly responsible for enforcing the
rules and large, influential countries are less likely to comply with the pact’s fiscal policy
rules (De Haan et al. 2004, 257). Although the introduction of the so–called “reversed
qualified majority”2 in the course of the Six–Pack reform increases the possibility for earlier
sanctions, it is unclear whether it will solve the challenging task of enhancing the fiscal
discipline of sovereign member states (Bauer and Becker 2014, 219–220; Buti and Carnot
2012, 906–908).
Finally, there is limited room for possible improvements of the pact. For example,
the exclusion of “fiscal sinners” from the voting procedure would improve the effectiveness
of punishing fiscal free–riders (Irlenbusch et al. 2003, 650–662). On the other hand, the
introduction of a communication phase would reduce the prevalence of excessive deficits
and ensure strong cooperation, but would have no effect on the frequency of sanctioning
(Irlenbusch et al. 2003, 651–663).
In sum, both economists and political scientists find evidence that the SGP and its en-
forcement by the Commission were not successful in enhancing member states’ compliance
with the fiscal rules of the EU, and that even improving the pact is rather difficult. This
evidence is supported by some descriptive statistics.
2The “reversed qualified majority rule” established that member states have to vote
against sanctions and no longer for them if the SGP is violated (Bauer and Becker 2014,
219–220; Buti and Carnot 2012, 906–908).
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Figure 5: Number of SGP Violations per Country since 2002
Figure 5 3 illustrates that all EU countries have broken the SGP rules (either the deficit
or debt rule) several times, with Denmark having the lowest number of violations (1),
while many other states – including large member states like Germany, France and Italy –
committed up to sixteen violations4. However, these violations rarely result in sanctions:
as Table 1 5, shows, a violation of the SGP’s rules (either > 3% of GDP or a debt level >
60% of GDP) only led to the opening of an EDP in 29 out of 144 cases 6. Overall, these
numbers confirm the impression of ineffective sanctioning by the Commission.
3Figure 5 has been created with ggplot2 (Wickham 2016).
4The statistics presented in both the graph and table are based on a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if either or both a country’s deficit or debt level exceeds the
pact’s respective reference values of 3 or 60 percent and either ratio does not follow a
diminishing trend, as defined in Article 126 of the Treaty on the the Functioning of the
European Union (European Union 2008).
5Table 1 has been created using the R–package descr (Aquino et al. 2016).
6EDP has been measured as the occurrence of the Commission’s opinion on an excessive
deficit for a given country and year.
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Table 1: Number of Sanctioned and Non–Sanctioned SGP Violations since 2002
EDP
SGP Violation 0 1 Total
0 253 9 262
1 115 29 144
Total 368 38 406
Thus, most studies on the SGP have been concerned with either a) its “top–down”
effectiveness in terms of deficit or debt reductions and possible explanations for this or b)
indirect mechanisms that affect the Commission’s (sanctioning) behavior such as member
states’ influence on CSRs (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016, 968–971; Börzel 2003b, 1–2; van der
Veer and Haverland 2018, 1). Regrettably, no studies investigated any direct “bottom–up”
determinants of the Commission’s (non–)sanctioning behavior via opening an EDP, the
SGP’s enforcement mechanism (Börzel 2003b, 1–2; European Central Bank 2003, 59; Pro-
tocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure 2008).
Even though it used to be the Council that has to agree on imposing sanctions on a lit-
igant member state7, it is the European Commission that – as the EU’s central monitoring
agency – is responsible for enforcing compliance with the SGP (Bauer and Becker 2014,
215–222; De Haan et al. 2004, 257; König and Mäder 2014; Köhler et al. 2018, 1–2). As
written down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission
takes the first initiative step towards these sanctions by initiating an EDP via delivering
the “Commission’s opinion on the existence of an excessive deficit” (European Union 2008;
De Haan et al. 2004, 257; European Central Bank 2003, 59; European Commission 2017b;
Köhler et al. 2018, 1–2; Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure 2008). How-
ever, given the pattern shown in Table 1, the question is: Why does breaking the SGP’s
rules not lead to consequent sanctioning by the Commission? The theoretical framework
presented in the following part will provide an answer to this question.
7The so called Six–Pack reform introduced the principle of “reverse qualified majority
voting”, which means that from now onwards a qualified majority in the Council has to
vote against sanctions rather than for sanctions as in the past, thereby strengthening the
Commission’s role in monitoring and sanctioning non–compliance with the SGP (Bauer
and Becker 2014, 215–222).
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5 Theoretical Framework –
Determinants of Non–Majoritarian
Decision–Making
The European Commission is responsible for fiscal surveillance and enforcing compliance
with the SGP if a member state’s budget exceeds the pact’s deficit– or debt reference
value. In this section, I explain that the Commission struggles with this task because it
faces a legitimacy and a transparency problem at the member state level which stems from
its design as a supranational NMI. For this purpose, I first briefly review two theoretical
models on NMI decision–making and their most important implications. Based on these
implications, I will derive my argument on what determines the Commission’s ineffective
sanctioning within the SGP.
5.1 The Legitimacy Problem of the European Com-
mission
The European Commission is appointed by member state governments to act as the EU’s
executive in general and an enforcer of compliance with the rules of the SGP within EMU
in particular (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016, 968–972; Follesdal and Hix 2006, 535–536; Köh-
ler et al. 2018, 9). As such, it lacks any electoral legitimacy since it is neither directly
or indirectly elected (Follesdal and Hix 2006, 535–536). The key problem in the Commis-
sion’s institutional design is that its legitimacy is limited compared with member state
governments it is supposed to sanction. This is problematic in the context of the SGP
since the Commission’s lack of legitimacy is assiciated with a lack of authority to enforce
the compliance of elected governments.
23
Because the Commission is not directly elected but equipped with public authority, it
can be classified as a NMI (Thatcher and Sweet 2002, 1–2). These institutions are known
to rely on public support to gain legitimacy and consequently the necessary authority to
sanction governments (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 695; Köhler et al. 2018, 11–15; Vanberg
2005, 19–24).
In order to illustrate the role of public support for the Commission’s sanctioning behav-
ior, Köhler et al. (2018) set up a bargaining game between the European Commission and
EU member state governments about compliance with the SGP’s fiscal rules. The model
provides predictions about when the Commission will launch an EDP to sanction member
states that have broken the rules of the SGP depending on voters’ support for compliance
with the SGP.
The model is set up as follows: the main actors are the European Commission and a
member state government. In the first stage of the game, the government decides on a
budget, whose compliance with the SGP’s rules is evaluated by the Commission (Köhler
et al. 2018, 16–18). Naturally, if the budget is in line with the SGP, the game ends (Köhler
et al. 2018, 20–21). If not, the Commission has to decide whether to open an EDP or not,
and if it does not, the game ends (Köhler et al. 2018, 20–21). After the initiation of an
EDP and the public’s reaction to it, the government makes the decision about whether to
adjust the budget or not (Köhler et al. 2018, 21). If it adjusts B, the game ends (Köhler
et al. 2018, 21). Otherwise, the Commission has to decide about escalating the conflict or
not, where the government will only endure costs in the former case (Köhler et al. 2018,
21).
Note that the decision to initiate an EDP at the second stage of the game is not a
simple one based only on whether the reference values of the pact are violated; rather,
the Commission has to take into account that – in contrast to itself – the government is
directly elected and represents the interests of its voters.
The crucial aspect of the model for understanding the sanctioning behavior of the
Commission is that the bargaining position of both the government and the Commission
is determined by voters’ relative preferences in terms of overspending due to consumptive
interests versus normative considerations about fiscal responsibility, namely compliance
with the SGP (Köhler et al. 2018, 4–22).
The government is affected by voters’ preferences given that it will suffer from “audience
costs” if it does not support voters’ interest (Köhler et al. 2018, 17). If voters are more in
favor of fiscal responsibility than consumption based on (over)spending, the government
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faces high audience costs due to a credibility loss caused by the violation of the SGP’s rules,
which can remove it from office (Köhler et al. 2018, 17–18). This threat will then make
it comply with the rules of the SGP, whereby the government is in a “weak” bargaining
position (Köhler et al. 2018, 17–18). By contrast, if most voters prefer overspending against
fiscal consolidation, the government’s audience costs and thus the threat of being removed
from office are low even if it does not follow the rules of the SGP (Köhler et al. 2018,
17–18). In this case, the government is in a “strong” bargaining position (Köhler et al.
2018, 17–18).
Similarly to the government’s audience costs, the Commission will face “enforcement
costs” that stem from a loss in credibility if it fails to achieve compliance (Köhler et al.
2018, 18). It faces low enforcement costs if the government is in a “weak” bargaining
position since voters prefer fiscal responsibility over non–compliance (Köhler et al. 2018,
18). However, if the government has a “strong” position in the compliance conflict because
most voters prefer overspending against fiscal consolidation, the Commission is confronted
with high costs when enforcing compliance with the SGP (Köhler et al. 2018, 18). In sum,
the Commission’s enforcement costs are inversely related to the type of the government,
where a weak government bears low and a strong government high enforcement costs
(Köhler et al. 2018, 4–19).
Besides enforcement costs, the Commission also faces “reputation costs” that are im-
posed by other governments if it fails to enforce compliance with the SGP’s fiscal rules
(Köhler et al. 2018, 18). This is because failed enforcement can motivate other govern-
ments to overspend and also violate the SGP’s rules (Köhler et al. 2018, 18–19). The
amount of reputation costs is related to the probability of succeeding in a compliance con-
flict which depends on the government’s type (Köhler et al. 2018, 18–22). Naturally, the
Commission will only escalate the conflict in the last stage of the game only against “weak
governments” (where public support for fiscal consolidation is high) since it can always ex-
pect the government to comply in this case (Köhler et al. 2018, 22–23). This implies that
if public support for fiscal responsibility is high, both the Commission’s enforcement costs
and reputation costs are low. In equilibrium, the Commission will only initiate an EDP
if the gains from compliance are larger than both the enforcement and reputation costs
imposed from other countries; otherwise, it will refrain from doing so (Köhler et al. 2018,
24–25). Recall that the Commission’s enforcement costs are high if it faces a “strong” gov-
ernment where the majority of voters prefers overspending over fiscal responsibility (Köhler
et al. 2018, 18). Moreover, its reputation costs depend on the probability of success which
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is higher in case of a “weak” government where public support for fiscal consolidation is
high (Köhler et al. 2018, 22–23). Overall, the predictions of the model imply that the
initiation of an EDP by the European Commission is mainly driven by the relative amount
of voters’ support for compliance with the SGP versus support for overspending.
5.2 The Transparency Problem of the European Com-
mission
The model developed by Köhler et al. (2018) stresses the importance of public support
for the Commission’s decision to open an EDP. However, the Commission faces another
difficulty when confonted with member state non–compliance. Due to its supranational
nature, it has imperfect information about whether an excessive fiscal policy on the member
state level is justified – for example, in the occurrence of a sudden economic crisis – or
is exclusively caused by serving voters’ consumptive interests (Köhler et al. 2018, 5–15).
Moreover, this imperfect information is made worse in the case of creative accounting (von
Hagen and Wolff 2006).
In that sense, the government faces a trade–off between responsibility and responsive-
ness (Köhler et al. 2018, 2–7). Responsibility broadly refers to making decisions while
considering their consequences (Pennock 1952, 796–797). In the context of the SGP, it
means (long–term) fiscal responsibility by complying with the rules of the pact (Köhler
et al. 2018, 2–7). On the other hand, responsiveness can be defined as “responding easily
to any and all demands” (Pennock 1952, 791). In terms of (non)–compliance with fiscal
rules, it refers to meeting the (short–term) consumptive demands of voters (Köhler et al.
2018, 2). Consequently, a responsible government will comply with the SGP (Köhler et al.
2018, 2–9). However, in case of non–compliance and the decision to initiate an EDP, the
Commission has to decide whether the government is merely responsive to voters’ (con-
sumptive) demands or whether it spends more due to economic trouble, which would be the
case in the presence of an economic shock (Köhler et al. 2018, 11–15). Since only the gov-
ernment has perfect information on the true nature of non–compliance, the Commission is
uncertain when deciding about sanctioning overspending member state governments (Köh-
ler et al. 2018, 5–15). If it sanctions a state that already faces a recession, the Commission
would make itself even more unpopular among voters and further undermine its legitimacy
(Köhler et al. 2018, 5–15). Besides a lack of legitimacy, the Commission therefore also
faces lack of transparency.
26
In order to understand the role of transparency for the Commission’s sanctioning be-
havior in the context of the SGP, it is helpful to consider theories on NMI decision–making
from judicial politics. Here, researchers early recognized the tension between a consti-
tutional court, which is responsible to ensure that laws made by the government are in
line with the country’s constitution, and the government (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 695;
Vanberg 2005, 19–24). Similar to the Commission, the core problem of the court is that it
is not legitimized directly via elections, which defines it as an NMI (Caldeira and Gibson
1992, 695; Thatcher and Sweet 2002, 2); Vanberg 2005, 19–24).
Vanberg (2005) develops a simple game–theoretic model to explain the interaction be-
tween a constitutional court and a government. His key argument is that the amount of
public support directly translates into political power, which helps to enforce (judicial)
decisions (Vanberg 2005, 19–20). The simple mechanism behind this is that ignoring a
court’s decision in the presence of citizens that regard judicial independence as important
will lead to a loss of public support for the government and hence a loss of political power
(Vanberg 2005, 19–20). This threat gives governments an incentive to comply with the
court’s rulings (Vanberg 2005, 19–20). However, even in case of non–compliance, govern-
ments will usually refrain from publicly admitting that they are not willing to implement
the court’s decision since they anticipate that most citizens value judicial independence
(Vanberg 2005, 21–22). Rather, the government will try to simply ignore the court’s ruling
(Vanberg 2005, 21–22). In such a situation, it becomes clear that it is not sufficient that
the public supports the court to make the government comply, it is also crucial that citizens
recognize government evasion (Vanberg 2005, 21). Thus, recognition involves monitoring
of the government’s reactions to the court’s decision and the activation of public support
for the court in case of non–compliance of the government (Vanberg 2005, 21–22). This
monitoring capacity, in turn, depends on the amount of transparency of the political envi-
ronment (Vanberg 2005, 22–23). Note that not only the government bears some political
costs, also the court does in case of governmental non–compliance since it undermines the
court’s authority (Vanberg 2005, 27). Therefore, the court is interested in the implemen-
tation of its decisions (Vanberg 2005, 27). Moreover, both the court and the government
are uncertain about the levels of public support and transparency in their environment,
so their behavior depends on these actors’ subjective beliefs about the joint probability of
these two conditions (Vanberg 2005, 24–28). In addition, the model considers the court’s
preferences, which can be either in line with the government (“convergent”) or against
them (“non–convergent”) and will affect the behavior of the court as well (Vanberg 2005,
27
24–28).
From the equilibria that Vanberg (2005) derives from his model, those that predict the
behavior of the non–convergent court conditional on the levels of the joint probability of
public support and transparency hold particular interest (Vanberg 2005, 28–36).
If public support and transparency are low, a non–convergent court will not veto legis-
lation since it anticipates evasion (Vanberg 2005, 32). If public support and transparency
are high, the court will veto the law the government has passed, and the government will
comply afterwards (Vanberg 2005, 34–35). Finally, if the joint probability of public sup-
port and transparency are at an intermediate level, a non–convergent court will veto the
government’s legislation despite expecting government evasion (Vanberg 2005, 35–37). In
sum, Vanberg’s (2005) model considers not only public support, but also transparency as
a decisive influence factor on NMI decision–making.
The link of this model to the case of the European Commission is that both the court
and the Commission can be classified as NMIs since they possess some separate public au-
thority, but are not legitimized via elections. Moreover, similar to a court, the Commission
can “veto” a governmental decision, albeit not on a law which might not be in line with the
constitution, but on a budget that violates the rules of the SGP. Finally, the Commission
can be seen as a permanent non–convergent NMI because as the “watchdog” of the SGP, it
is always in favor of compliance and would therefore never prefer governmental overspend-
ing. As such, the Commission’s sanctioning behavior can be expected to be similar to the
one of a non–convergent constitutional court that is affected by the levels of both public
support and transparency.
However, the transparency problem of the Commission is somewhat different from the
one of the court: in Vanberg’s (2005) model, the constitutional court is in need of a trans-
parent political environment that provides citizens with information on government evasion,
which then mobilizes public support and helps the court to finally achieve the government’s
compliance. In the case of the SGP, in contrast, I argue that the Commission is in need of
transparency about the country’s economic situation before opening an EDP to reduce its
uncertainty about whether the government’s SGP violation is due to voter responsiveness
or not. Only if sufficient transparency about the respective country’s economic conditions
are given does the Commission not risk a loss in public support in the future caused by
unjustified sanctioning.
The only possibility for the Commission to infer about the government’s responsiveness
to voters is to evaluate whether an excessive deficit or debt level is due to extraordinary
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circumstances such as an economic crisis. Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union asks the European Commission to consider the economic situation of
a country so that it “[...] shall examine compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis
of the following two criteria: (a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government
deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless: [...] the excess over
the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the
reference value;” and b) “whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product
exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the
reference value at a satisfactory pace” (Buti et al. 1998, 84; European Union 2008). The
pact further defines a sudden decline in real GDP by between 0.75 and 2 percent in the re-
spective year as “exceptional and temporary”, which allows for flexibility during recessions
(Buti et al. 1998, 84; Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998, 70).
Based on the legal framework of the pact, the Commission can conclude that over-
spending is not caused by unusual economic turbulences if the above–mentioned criteria
of exceptionality and temporality are not met. In this case, transparency on the country’s
economic situation is given insofar that the Commission will use the absence of difficult
economic circumstances as a signal that a SGP violation is due to the government’s needs to
serve voters’ consumptive interests. Consequently, it will initiate an EDP without risking
a further loss in public support.
5.3 Public Support and Transparency as Determinants
of EDP Initiations
I have already stated above that the European Commission – like constitutional courts
– can be defined as a NMI. I further argue that the Commission is confronted with a
legitimacy and transparency problem which is caused by its design as a supranational
NMI. The identification of these two problems allow me to draw the following arguments
about the determinants of EDP openings by the Commission.
First, the level of voters’ support for the Commission and/or the rules that it enforces
– in either absolute or relative terms compared with the amount of support for the gov-
ernment – matters for its sanctioning behavior. Only if the Commission enjoys a sufficient
amount of public support does it have sufficient legitimacy and therefore political power
to sanction rule–violations by (elected) governments.
Second, public support is not sufficient to explain the sanctioning behavior of the Com-
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mission. Since the Commission is uncertain about the true nature of governmental non-
compliance – namely whether it is caused by voter responsiveness or economic shocks –
and would risk a future loss in public support if it sanctions a country that suffers from a
recession regardless – it requires sufficient transparency about the economic situation of a
country before opening an EDP. Table 2 provides an overview of the determinants of EDP
initiations per theory.
Table 2: Overview: Determinants of EDP Initiations
Vanberg (2005) Köhler et al. (2018)
Absolute Public Support for NMI Relative Public Support for NMI
Transparency
In sum, from the conclusions made above, I expect the Commission to open an EDP
only if public support for compliance with the SGP is high and the respective country is
not suffering from a recession. From this expectation, the following, testable hypothesis
can be derived:
H1: If there is public support for compliance with the SGP and transparency is high,
the Commission will initiate an EDP to sanction SGP violations.
Having outlined the theoretical framework and the causal mechanism I am interested
in, I will continue with the description of the research design to test Hypothesis 1.
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6 Research Design
6.1 Potential Outcome Framework
In order to determine which quantities shall be estimated in this investigation, it is crucial
to set up a so–called “potential outcome framework” as proposed by Rubin (2005) (Rubin
2005, 323–326). Based on this framework, the causal effect to be investigated here can
be described as follows: let units (i) be countries that have violated the SGP, treatment
(X) the amount of public support for the Commission for a country in a given year,
outcome (Y ) sanctions initiated by the Commission for that country and that given year
(where outcomes in treatment states are Y0 (= no sanctions), and Y1 (= sanctions), Q an
effect modifier indicating transparency about the country’s economic situation, and ∆ the
treatment effect (Rubin 2005, 323–326; Pearl 2009, 133–136; VanderWeele and Robins 2007,
3). Each unit i (country) is only observed in one treatment state, i.e. Xi = 0 (low public
support for the Commission) or Xi = 1 (absence of public support for the Commission)
(Rubin 2005, 323). Moreover, each unit has one observed outcome, i.e. either Yi0 (no
sanctions) or Yi1 (sanctions). Furthermore, one only ever observes Yi = XiYi1 + (1˘Xi)Yi0
(Rubin 2005, 323). The causal effect of the treatment X (Public Support) on outcome
Y (EDP initiation) comparing two levels of the treatment (X = 0 and X = 1) given a
modifier Q (Transparency) is defined as Yi(1)|Q = q˘Yi(0)|Q = q, where the causal effect
of X is not constant in q (Rubin 2005, 323; VanderWeele and Robins 2007, 3). Both the
treatment and the moderation effect as described by Hypothesis 1 are illustrated in Figure
6 .
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Figure 6: Causal Effect to be Investigated According to Hypothesis 1
Transparency
Public Support // // EDP Initiation
Generally, I am interested in the average treatment effect of public support on sanc-
tions initiated by the Commission given the absence/presence of transparency about the
country’s economic situation. However, for the analysis it is crucial to determine whether
the third variable transparency acts like a moderator or a mediator since each requires a
different modeling technique (Baron and Kenny 1986, 1174–1177). According to Baron
and Kenny (1986), a moderator is not strongly related to both the treatment and the out-
come, while Kraemer et al. (2002) propose to test for correlation between treatment and
moderator to distinguish it from mediators (Baron and Kenny 1986, 1177–1178; Kraemer
et al. 2002, 879–881).
In order to determine whether transparency acts a as a moderator or a mediator,
I assessed the relation between each transparency indicator and the treatment variable
public support as well as the two measures of the outcome variable EDP initiation, respec-
tively. Unfortunately, since the moderator/mediator variable transparency (measured by
real GDP and GDP growth) is continuous, while the dependent variable EDP initiation is
a binary variable, a correlation analysis is not possible due to the different scaling of these
variables (Gehring and Weins 2009, 141). Instead, I checked the value of η2, a measure of
strength of association between a nominal and a continuous variable 1, between the binary
EDP indicators and real GDP (Gehring and Weins 2009, 141; Pierce et al. 2004, 917). η2
ranges from 0 to 1 and allows me to evaluate whether transparency acts as a moderator
or a mediator since higher values indicate a stronger association between two variables
(Gehring and Weins 2009, 141; Pierce et al. 2004, 917–918). The association between the
transparency and the outcome variable EDP proved to be very weak (close to 0).
Because both the treatment variable public support and the mediator/moderator vari-
able transparency are measured by continuous variables, I conducted a simple Pearson’s
correlation analysis between each public support– and transparency indicator, respectively
(Gehring and Weins 2009, 165–170). Here, Pearson’s r only indicated a weak to medium
1The value of η2 was assessed by using the R–package BaylorEdPsych (Beaujean 2012).
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correlation (Gehring and Weins 2009, 170). Due to the absence of a strong correlation of
transparency to both the treatment and the outcome, transparency can be defined as a
moderator, not as a mediator (Baron and Kenny 1986, 1177–1178).
6.2 Data
The data sources used for this analysis are the Quality of Government dataset (version
of January 2019), the Eurobarometer survey, Eurostat, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank and the website of the European Commission and the Organiza-
tion for Security and Co–operation in Europe . The data from these various sources are
combined in a net dataset2. I will focus on all EU countries since the SGP applies to all EU
states, not only to the Eurozone members (European Commission 2017d). Countries that
have not been part of the EU at a given year yet are excluded from the analysis because
the SGP is not applicable to them in this case.
As the time period to be investigated, I choose the period from 2002 to 2017 since
this is the longest period for which data on the dependent and independent variables
are available since the introduction of the Euro in 1999 (European Commission 2017b;
European Union 2018b). Moreover, because I aim to explain variation in EDP initiations
by the Commission among “fiscal sinners” by public support and transparency, the dataset
only comprises observations where a) a member country’s deficit level exceeded 3% of GDP
and/or its debt level was higher than 60% of GDP in a given year3 and b) there exists an
increasing trend of the deficit or debt ratio at the same time (European Union 2008) 4.
2The following R–packages have been used for data preparation: car, dplyr,
countrycode, foreign, gdata, readstata13, readxl, and lubridate (Arel-Bundock
2017; Fox and Weisberg 2011; Garbuszus and Jeworutzki 2016; Grolemund and Wick-
ham 2011; R Core Team 2015; Warnes et al. 2017; Wickham and Bryan 2017; Wickham
et al. 2017).
3In line with Protocol No. 12 annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), deficit is measured as annual net lending/borrowing (current and capital
account) as a percentage of GDP, while debt is measured as general government gross
debt as a percentage of GDP (Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure 2008;
Eurostat 2018); International Monetary Fund 2019b).
4The diminishing trend is coded based on two variables, ∆Deficit and ∆Debt, that measure
the difference of the Deficit/Debt ratio between year t and year t˘1 (Kohler and Kreuter
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The consideration of the two trend criteria besides the reference values for deficit and
debt is necessary to account for the fact that the pact allows for no sanctions if a country’s
deficit and/or debt ratio has declined before, even if they exceed the pact’s reference values,
and to account for countries that remain shortly below the reference values despite rising
deficit and debt levels (European Union 2008).
The dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if an EDP was opened
against a given country in a given year, and 0 otherwise. I refrain from coding years with an
ongoing EDP as 1 since I focus on the determinants of the initiation of an EDP, which is up
to the Commission, and not their continuation, which is decided by the Council (European
Central Bank 2003, 59). For the countries and the time period to be investigated, 29 EDPs
occurred5.
Note that studies on Commission decision–making are usually prone to self–selection
bias as the Commission only publishes cases of successful sanctioning (Fjelstul and Car-
rubba 2018, 429–437). However, this investigation is less likely to suffer from such a
self–selection bias as no EDP initiation by the Commission so far led to the imposition
of fines by the Council, which would be the analogy to a court ruling against a litigant
member state (European Commission 2017b).
Hypothesis 1 postulates an impact of public support for the Commission on EDP ini-
tiations conditional on the moderator transparency. Because moderators can be included
in the analysis via interacting it with the treatment, the key independent variables of
interest are six interaction terms consisting of each public support– and transparency indi-
2008, 79). A negative value of ∆Deficit indicates that a country’s deficit increased in year
t compared with the previous year. By contrast, a positive value of ∆Debt means that the
debt ratio to GDP of a country increased at time t. However, note that the terms “closeness
to the reference value” and “sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value
at a satisfactory pace” as referred to in Article 126 for both a country’s deficit and debt
level are not defined. Since this lack of definition makes these two conditions unmeasurable,
they can not be considered when creating the dataset on cases of SGP violations (European
Union 2008; (Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998, 70).
5According to King and Zeng (2001) an event can be considered as rare event if less
than 5% of the data indicate its occurrence (King and Zeng 2001, 157). For a N of 144 in
the dataset used for the statistical analysis (SGP violations only), a number of 7.2 EDPs
would be equal to 5% of the data. However, since the occurrence of 29 EDPs exceeds 5%
of the observations in each dataset, I will not apply any rare events specification.
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cator,respectively (Baron and Kenny 1986, 1174; Brambor et al. 2006, 64; Kraemer et al.
2002, 880). Following Ai and Norton (2003), there will be a separate model for each of
the six interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003, 126). Besides the interaction terms, its
constituent terms will be included in the model to avoid an omitted variable bias of the
estimates (Brambor et al. 2006, 66–67).
In addition, I will control for possible confounding variables (Pearl 2009, 113–114).
These are influential member states, non–compliance of other member states, the number
of infringement procedures in a given year per country, Eurozone membership, SGP reforms
implemented in the aftermath of the EU’s financial and economic crisis and elections.
The operationalization of these variables as well as the reason for their inclusion will be
presented in the following.
6.2.1 Variables and Operationalization
Dependent Variable and Independent Variables
Dependent Variable – Commission’s Initiation of an EDP: For the EDP procedure,
two steps can be distinguished (European Union 2008; European Central Bank 2003, 59).
At the beginning, there is the assessment stage, where the EDP is initiated (European
Union 2008; European Central Bank 2003, 59). This stage involves the writing of a report
by the Commission if a given country violates the Pact’s reference values or is at risk
of an excessive deficit (European Union 2008; European Central Bank 2003, 59). The
Commission further decides on whether it will send an opinion to the Council on the
existence or risk of an excessive deficit (European Union 2008; European Central Bank
2003, 59). If it does, the Council finally decides whether the country’s deficit is indeed
excessive (European Union 2008; European Central Bank 2003, 59). If it does not, the
EDP is closed. In the case that the Council decides that a country’s deficit violates the
rules of the SGP, it formulates a recommendation for measures to correct the excessive
deficit and sets a deadline when this correction has to be completed (European Union
2008; European Central Bank 2003, 59).
The second stage of the EDP procedure allows the Council to impose sanctions on the
accusing memberstate (European Union 2008; European Central Bank 2003, 59). If the
Council shares the opinion that the country has implemented the recommended measures,
the EDP is suspended until the Council decides that the excessive deficit has been corrected
in a timely manner (European Union 2008; European Central Bank 2003, 59). More
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procedural steps such as further recommendations, deadlines or new targets might follow
if the country has not implemented the recommended measures or if they are insufficient
(European Union 2008; European Central Bank 2003, 59; European Commission 2017a)6.
Finally, in the case of overall non–compliance, the Council can sanction the reluctant
country by a deposit and eventually a fine (European Union 2008; European Central Bank
2003, 59).
From the EDP’s procedural stages we can see that the European Commission’s role is
reduced to the assessment step of the procedure, where it takes two decisions: the first
one is to identify non–compliance and write a report and the second one on the existence
of an excessive deficit that is addressed to the Council, which leads to the continuation
of the EDP 7. Due these two decision–making steps, two codings for EDP initiations will
be used: first, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the Commission publishes a
report about a given country in a given year that breached or is at risk to violate the rules
of the SGP (“EDP–Report”); and second, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the
Commission’s opinion on the existence of an excessive deficit is present for a given country
and year, and 0 otherwise (“EDP–Opinion”). Because only the transfer of such an opinion
to the Council marks the Commission’s final decision on the existence of an excessive deficit
in a given country, the primary analysis will be run using the “EDP–Opinion” variable,
while the “EDP–Report”–specification will be used to assess the robustness of the results
(European Union 2008). Both codings are based on the overview of EDPs published on
the Commission’s website (European Commission 2017b).
Key Independent Variable 1 – Public Support: Public support for the European
6The scope and frequency of monitoring the effectiveness of the measure implementation
has been increased by the Two–Pack regulation (European Commission 2018a). Now, the
concerning member state has to report its progress every three to six month in order to
ensure the early detection of implementation failure before the deadline set by the Council
(European Commission 2018a).
7Note that in contrast to the opening of infringement procedures, such as investigated
by Fjelstul and Carruba (2018), the Commission will not announce an opinion on the
existence of an excessive deficit to the Council if the respective country has not taken any
action to reduce its deficit and/or debt level after the publishment of the report (Fjelstul
and Carrubba 2018, 431–437). Therefore, a conditional coding as a means to overcome
self–selection problems such as done by Fjelstul and Carruba (2018) is not possible.
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Commission/compliance with the SGP will be operationalized by three indicators: first, the
absolute level of trust in the European Commission based on the respective Eurobarometer
item (Vanberg’s (2005) interpretation, see Table 2 ), second, the relative level of trust
in the Commission relative to trust in the national government (Köhler et al.’s (2018)
interpretation, see Table 2), that are both based on the respective Eurobarometer items,
and third, the Eurobarometer item asking whether the respondents have a positive image of
the EU on a scale (European Commission 2018b, European Commission 2018c). I explain
these indicators in further detail in the following paragraphs.
Public support for the Commission’s policy is operationalized as trust in the Commis-
sion here because people are more likely to accept decisions and policies – such as the rules
of the SGP – by institutions that they trust as they consider them to be legitimate (Marien
and Hooghe 2011, 268). Since the theory of Vanberg (2005) focuses on the absolute level
of public support for the NMI only , the absolute level of trust in the Commission is used
as the first indicator in this investigation (Vanberg 2005, 19–49). In order to determine
the degree of trust in the Commission in each country, the variable measuring the level of
trust in the Commission taken from the Eurobarometer survey will be recoded as a dummy
variable, where 1 indicates trust and 0 no trust. “Don’t know” answers are coded as an
extra category. In order to determine the degree of trust in the Commission in each coun-
try, I will then compute the share of individuals that expressed trust in the Commission
per country.
In contrast to Vanberg (2005), Köhler et al. (2018) highlight the importance of the
relative level of public support as the Commission’s decision to initiate an EDP is based on
whether most voters support compliance with the SGP or overspending (Köhler et al. 2018,
17–25). Therefore, the level of public support for the national government’s overspending
policy besides the level of public support for the Commission needs to be taken into account.
Public support for governmental overspending will be measured by the Eurobarometer item
asking for the degree of trust towards the national government. I choose this indicator
because high trust in the national government increases public support for government
(over)spending (European Commission 2017c); Rudolph and Evans 2005, 669). As for
public support for the European Commission, the share of individuals that expressed trust
in the national government per country is computed.
In order to measure the relative amount of public support for compliance with the SGP
compared with the amount of support for overspending, I generate a variable where the
share of individuals that trust the national government is subtracted from the share of indi-
37
viduals expressing trust in the Commission for each country and year (Kohler and Kreuter
2008, 79). If public support for the Commission (= support for compliance with the SGP)
is relatively higher than support for the national government (= support for overspending),
then the variable takes a positive value. The higher the Commission’s support vis–à–vis
support for the national government, the higher is that value and consequently, support
for compliance with the SGP’s fiscal rules. In that case, the probability for the initiation
of an EDP is expected to increase if a country’s deficit and/or debt level is not in line with
the SGP rules.
Finally, the possibility that people mistrust the Commission since it is often perceived
as a “bureaucracy”, but generally support the EU and its regulations, needs to be taken
into account (Christiansen 1997, 76). For this purpose, I follow McLaren (2007) and De
Vries and van Kersbergen (2007) and use the Eurobarometer item asking for a positive
image of the EU to check the robustness of the results (McLaren 2007, 241; De Vries and
Kersbergen 2007, 314). Since the indicator measuring whether the interviewed person has
a positive image of the EU is a scale variable ranging from 1 ( = “very negative”) over 3
(= “neutral”) to (4) (= “fairly positive”) and 5 (= “very positive”), I compute the share of
individuals that stated to have a “very” or “fairly” positive image of the EU per country
from this variable (European Commission 2018b). As for the previous public support
indicators, this variable will be interacted with each transparency indicator.
Key Independent Variable 2 – Transparency: As explained in the theory section
above, transparency refers to the situation where the Commission can infer that a violation
of the SGP’s deficit and/or debt rule is due to voter’s consumption interests and not caused
by an unexpected economic shock (Köhler et al. 2018, 5–15; Vanberg 2005, 45–49). The
pact sees an “exceptional and temporary” deficit as in case of a recession as given if there
is a sudden decline in real GDP in the respective year (European Union 2008; Buti et al.
1998, 84; Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998, 70). If these criteria for exceptionality and
temporality are not met, the Commission will know that the government violates the pact
to serve voters’ consumption preferences and initiate sanctions. As mentioned in the pact,
transparency will be measured by real GDP (constant 2010 U.S. dollar) (The World Bank
Group 2019). If a country violates the pact while having a rise in real GDP, it is obvious
that a recession is absent and the probability of an EDP initiation increases.
Besides the decline in real GDP as defined by the pact, negative GDP growth is an-
other indicator that a country suffers from an economic recession (Blanchard 1993, 2070).
Positive growth rates, in turn, would consequently indicate that a government is violating
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the pact due to deliberate overspending. Therefore, also this variable will be used as a
second transparency measure for robustness checks. GDP growth is measured by real GDP
growth in percent (International Monetary Fund 2019c).
Covariates
Pearl (2009) proposes to select the covariates of an analysis according to the so called
‘back–door’ criterion (Pearl 2009, 113). This can be explained as follows. When inves-
tigating the causal effect of X (public support) on Y (sanctions/no sanctions), there are
usually many additional measurable and unmeasurable factors around that influence either
Y or X or both X and Y (Pearl 2009, 113). To account for this problem, it is necessary
to select a subset of factors which values are held constant for both treated and untreated
subjects (Pearl 2009, 113). This is called an ‘admissible’ or ‘sufficient’ set (Pearl 2009,
113–114). An ‘admissible set’ S can be defined according to two criteria: first, no ele-
ment of S descends from treatment X, and second, the elements of S are blocking all
“back–door” paths from X to Y , namely all paths ending with an arrow pointing to treat-
ment X (Pearl 2009, 114). By conditioning for S, all “back–door” paths are blocked and
it can be ensured that only the causal effect from public support to EDP initiation condi-
tional on transparency, and no other spurious associations, will be measured (Pearl 2009,
114).
For this investigation, I identified the factors influential member states, non–compliance
of other member states, the number of infringement procedures in a given year per country,
Eurozone membership8, SGP reforms implemented in the aftermath of the EU’s financial
and economic crisis and national elections to be part of the admissible set S because both
arrow emitting nodes of these two variables are in S (Pearl 2009, 114). Their influence
on the causal effect of public support on EDP initiation conditional on high/low levels of
transparency is illustrated in Figure 7 to 10 and shall be explained in further detail in the
remainder of this section.
8Due to the application of a multi–level model in this investigation, it is noteworthy
that the inclusion of time–constant factors such as Eurozone membership improves the
estimation of the variance of the country–level units from the data (Shor et al. 2007,
176–177).
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Figure 7: Effect of Powerful Member States
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Figure 8: Effect of Non–Compliance of Other Member States
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Figure 9: Effect of Eurozone Membership
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Figure 10: Effect of National Elections
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Control Variable 1 – Powerful Member States: Influential member states –
particularly those having a large economy – affect both public support and the probability
of initiating an EDP by the Commission. One the one hand, voters in large member states
have become more Eurosceptic since the strengthening of the European Parliament in the
legislative process of the EU, the removal of an additional Commissioner from the larger
member states and the enlargement of the EU by small countries have diminished their
influence in the EU decision–making process (Hix 2007, 139–140). All of these changes
have made it less likely that the large member states would always achieve their preferred
policy outcome, whereby support for the EU consequently has decreased (Hix 2007, 140).
This reduced support for the EU as a whole is likely to reduce support for compliance with
the rules of the SGP.
On the other hand, Baerg and Hallerberg (2016) provide empirical evidence that power-
ful memberstates weakened the Commission’s assessments of fiscal performance and conse-
quently the pact’s sanctioning mechanisms (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016, 968–972). There-
fore, it is less likely that an EDP is opened against large member states. Furthermore,
Börzel (2001) argues that the responsibility of EU law implementation is on the member
states, which further weakens the European Commission since it is not directly politically
legitimized (Börzel 2001, 812). Therefore, it may treat powerful member states like France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands that contribute the most to the EU budget and
that have much voting power in the Council more carefully than others (Börzel 2001, 812;
Hix and Høyland 2011, 263–264). To control for the effect of these states, I create a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 for the countries Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the
Netherlands and 0 for the remaining countries.
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Control Variable 2 – Non–Compliance of other Member States: Increasing
non–compliance with the SGP is likely to reduce voters’ support for the Eurozone in other
countries (Köhler et al. 2018, 4). Consequently, also support for the rules of the SGP
as well as the Commission who is responsible to enforce these rules can be expected to
decrease (Köhler et al. 2018, 14).
The Commission, in turn, reacts with increased enforcement in case of repeated non-
compliance (Börzel 2003a, 198). In order to account for these two effects of non–compliance,
a variable that counts the number of member states that violated the rules of the SGP in
a given year will be included in the analysis.
Control Variable 3 – Eurozone Membership: Eurozone membership affects both
public support and EDP initiations: first, Kuhn and Stöckel (2014) find that Eurozone
member states are more in favor of European Economic Governance such as a strong
coordination of economic and financial policies (Kuhn and Stöckel 2014, 630–635). Due to
the important role of the SGP and the strong position of the Commission in economic policy
coordination, we can expect that support for European Economic Governance directly
translates into higher support for the SGP and the Commission in Eurozone countries
(Bauer and Becker 2014, 219–222).
Second, even though the rules of the SGP apply to all members of the EU, the fiscal
rules of the SGP are particularly relevant for the countries that are part of the currency
area (Buti and Giudice 2002, 824–825; Faini 2006, 446–447; European Commission 2017d).
This is because first, fiscal indiscipline of one member state can affect the overall Eurozone
interest rate (and thus other members’ fiscal situation) and second, price stability can no
longer be guaranteed by the ECB in case of high deficits and debt (Buti and Giudice 2002,
824–825; Faini 2006, 446–447). For these reasons, the Commission might be more eager to
sanction Eurozone members since excessive deficit or debt levels may threaten the stability
of the common currency. Due to this twofold effect of Eurozone membership, I include a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a country is member of the Eurozone and 0
otherwise in the analysis.
Control Variable 4 – National Elections: National elections affect public support
insofar that parties will more or less foster Euroscepticism among voters as a result of a
new cleavage between winners and losers of European integration (Kriesi 2007, 85). In
addition, national elections also influence the sanctioning behavior of the Commission. For
example, in 2014 an 2015, the Commission refrained from enforcing compliance against
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Spain due to upcoming elections (Wijsman and Crombez 2017, 5). In order to consider the
effect of national elections, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if either an executive
or legislative election is taking place in a given year, is added to the model. The coding is
based on two separate dummy variables that indicate the presence of either an executive
or legislative election in a given year, respectively (Teorell et al. 2019, 179; Teorell et al.
2019, 184). A missing observation in the dummy variable on the occurrence of legislative
elections for Estonia in 2016 was replaced by information on the occurrence of such an
election provied by the OSCE (OSCE 2019).
While the above sections have described the dependent, independent and control vari-
ables in detail, Table 3 provides an overview of all variables included in the model as well
as their expected effects. As for many social science research projects, the data for all of
the indicators listed in the table include missing values. The next part will thus focus on
the method of how I will deal with these missing observations.
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Table 3: Overview: Variables, Operationalization and Expected Effect on EDP Initiation
Variable Operationalization Ef-
fect
Dependent Variable
Excessive Deficit
Procedure – Opinion
Dummy: no opinion on existence of excessive deficit
= 0, opinion on existence of excessive deficit = 1
Excessive Deficit
Procedure – Report
Dummy: no initial Commission Report = 0, initial
Commission Report = 1
Independent Variables
Absolute Level of Public
Support (Vanberg 2005)
Share of respondents expressing trust in the
European Commission in the Eurobarometer survey
H1:
+
Relative Level of Public
Support (Köhler et al.
2018)
Difference between share of respondents expressing
trust in the European Commission and the share of
respondents expressing trust in the national
government in the Eurobarometer survey
H1:
+
Transparency (Vanberg
2001)
Real GDP (at constant 2011 national prices in
Millions, U.S. dollar)
H2:
+
Absolute Level of Public
Support × Transparency
(Vanberg 2005)
Interaction term consisting of absolute public support
indicator and Real GDP
H1:
+
Relative Level of Public
Support × Transparency
(Vanberg 2005 and Köhler
et al. 2018)
Interaction term consisting of relative public support
indicator and Real GDP
H1:
+
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Control Variables
Powerful Member States Dummy: 1 = Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the
Netherlands, 0 = for all other member states
Non–Compliance of
Other Member States
Number of Member States that violated the rules of
the SGP per year
Eurozone Membership Dummy: 0 = no member of Eurozone, 1 = member of
Eurozone
National Elections Dummy: 0 = no election, 1 = election
Robustness Checks
Positive Image of the
European Union
Share of individuals that states to have a very or fairly
positive image of the EU in the Eurobarometer survey
H1:
+
Transparency GDP Growth (%) H2:
+
Absolute Level of Public
Support × Transparency
Interaction term consisting of absolute public support
indicator and GDP Growth
H1:
+
Relative Level of Public
Support × Transparency
Interaction term consisting of relative public support
indicator and GDP Growth
H1:
+
Positive Image of
European Union ×
Transparency
Interaction term consisting of Positive Image of the
European Union and Real GDP
H1:
+
Positive Image of
European Union ×
Transparency
Interaction term consisting of Positive Image of the
European Union and GDP Growth
H1:
+
6.2.2 Data Imputation
Missing data is a well–known problem in Political Science research (King et al. 2001; König
et al. 2005; Lall 2016). Unsurprisingly, many of the political and economic variables to be
used for my analysis suffer from missing observations. Figure 11 9 provides an overview of
the amount of missing observations of each variable in the dataset 10.
9Figure 11 has been created using the R–package naniar (Tierney, Cook, McBain, and
Fay Tierney et al.).
10Most missing values occurred for the Eurobarometer data for the countries Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia , Malta, Poland,
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Figure 11: Overview of the Amount of Missing Observations per Variable
Usually, the most prominent method to deal with missing values is listwise deletion,
namely the removal of missing observations from the dataset (Lall 2016, 414). Unfortu-
nately, it has been confirmed that this method can bias the results of the following analysis
(King et al. 2001; Lall 2016). The reason is that listwise deletion only yields unbiased re-
sults if the missing observations are missing completely at random (MCAR), which means
that the missingness of the observations does not depend on any observations in the dataset
(König et al. 2005, 273; Lall 2016, 416). Since this assumption is not met in most of the
cases, listwise deletion is problematic (König et al. 2005, 273).
Besides listwise deletion, there are other comparatively easy methods to deal with
missing data. One of them is the imputation of missing values with the (unconditional)
mean (Jerez et al. 2010, 107–108; König et al. 2005, 274; Lall 2016, 418; Little 988a, 288).
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia for 2002 and 2003, as they were not part of the Euro-
barometer Survey that includes the items on trust in the European Commission, Trust in
the national government and the image of the EU (GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social
Sciences 2012a, VIII–IX; GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences 2012b, VII–VIII;
GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences 2012c, VIII–IX). These missing values
also contribute to the missing values in the indicator “Relative Public Support” and the
interaction terms.
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Furthermore, this tempting solution has a number of major drawbacks: For instance, mean
imputation leads to the same (biased) estimate as listwise deletion (Little 988a, 288). In
addition, standard errors are incorrect and downward–biased because they are a) calculated
based on a overstated sample size and b) imputed values are treated as known rather than
probabilistic estimates that account for uncertainty (Jerez et al. 2010, 107; Lall 2016,
418; Little 988a, 288). Second, because the same value is used for all cases with missing
data, mean imputation can distort the variance of the variables with missing data ( König
et al. 2005, 274; Schafer and Graham 2002, 149). Third, the method can not be applied
to variables measured at the nominal or ordinal level (König et al. 2005, 274). In sum,
neither listwise deletion nor mean imputation can be viewed as appropriate methods to
deal with missing data.
Due to the prominence of the missing value problem and the various disadvantages
associated with simple solutions to it, more sophisticated methods have been developed.
For these methods, the assumption that missing data are missing at random (MAR) –
which means that the missingness depends on observed data only – needs to hold 11 (Lall
2016, 416–423).
Unfortunately, the MAR case is difficult to distinguish from data that are missing not at
random (MNAR), where the missingness depends (in part) on the missing data themselves
(Lall 2016, 416–419). This identification is crucial, since even more sophisticated imputa-
tion methods will lead to biased results under MNAR (Lall 2016, 418). Unfortunately, it is
not possible to test whether missing data are MAR or MNAR since the causes or correlates
11Little (1988b) proposes a test for the MCAR assumption, which I applied to the dataset
used for this investigation using the R–package BaylorEdPsych (Beaujean 2012; Lall 2016,
421–423; Little 988b). The statistically significant result of the test confirmed that – as
expected – the MCAR assumption does not hold, so data imputation is preferable to listwise
deletion (Lall 2016, 421–423). For the test, the interaction terms, the dummy variables and
the non–compliance indicator were excluded from the dataset due to high collinearity with
the constitutive terms or the variables their coding was based on (Brambor et al. 2006,
70–71; Hardy 1993, 6). This is because the test yields no results in the presence of collinear
variables since linear dependence in the data leads to a singular matrix where the linear
system of equations has infinite solutions (Gill 2008, 146–159; Lall 2016, 423). Note that
I do not follow Lall (2016) in assessing the MAR–assumption via logistic regressions on
binary missingness indicators since it is generally impossible to test whether the assumption
of MAR holds (Lall 2016, 418–423; Schafer and Graham 2002, 152).
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of missing data are usually unknown to the researcher (Collins et al. 2001, 333). However,
it is possible to apply imputation techniques that are based on MAR since deviations from
this assumption may only have a minor impact on the results of the subsequent analysis
(Collins et al. 2001, 333; Schafer and Graham 2002, 152).
Jerez et al. (2010) distinguish between statistical and machine learning data imputation
methods (Jerez et al. 2010, 107). In Political Science, the statistical method of multiple
imputation (MI) seems to be the most prominent advanced imputation method (King
et al. 2001, 49; König et al. 2005, 274; Lall 2016, 417–418). MI is based on a parametric
imputation model that assumes that the complete data can be described by a multivariate
normal distribution (including unknown parameters) (Lall 2016, 418; Schafer 1999, 4–6).
This usually means that missing data are be predicted based on selected variables in the
dataset (Lall 2016, 425). MI is usually conducted via three stages: first, m values are
imputed for each missing observation, which yields m complete datasets (King et al. 2001,
53; Lall 2016, 417–418). These imputed values are independent draws from a posterior
distribution of the the missing data conditioning on data that can be observed (King et al.
2001, 53; Lall 2016, 418). The variation across these m imputed values indicates the
uncertainty about the correct imputation model (King et al. 2001, 53; Lall 2016, 417–418).
In a second step, m quantities of interests are estimated from these datasets (King et al.
2001, 53; Lall 2016, 418). Third, the m estimates are combined to one average estimate
(King et al. 2001, 53; Lall 2016, 418). The variance of this estimate is computed from the
weighted sum of the estimated variances within and between the m datasets (King et al.
2001, 53; Lall 2016, 418). MI generally yields unbiased estimates in the case of MAR and
MCAR (Jerez et al. 2010, 107; Lall 2016, 418; König et al. 2005, 270). Popular software
packages are Amelia and Amelia II (for time–series cross–sectional data), which work with
an Expectation Maximization algorithm (Honaker et al. 2011; King et al. 2001). Other
methods include Bayesian approaches or even the consideration of strategic concealment
(König et al. 2005, 285; Kong et al. 1994, 278).
Machine learning methods for data imputation seem so far to be less prominent in
Political Science. Jerez et al. (2010) compare the performance of statistical imputation
methods such as mean imputation, hot deck (= taking a missing observation from a similar
donor case with complete data), and MI with machine learning methods (Multi–layer
perceptron, Self–organization maps and k–nearest neighbors (KNN)) (Jerez et al. 2010,
105–108). Their analysis leads to two key findings: first, KNN, which imputes missing
values with the mean (for continuous data) or the mode (for categorical data) of observed
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data points that are located closely to the missing value (defined by some distance measure),
performs best (Jerez et al. 2010, 110–114). Second, machine learning methods generally
outperform statistical methods of data imputation (Jerez et al. 2010, 113–114)12.
Given the findings of Jerez et al. (2010), I choose a machine learning method instead
of a statistical approach for missing data imputation. However, applying KNN is not
possible here since my dataset includes both continuous and discrete variables (Stekhoven
and Bühlmann 2012, 112).
As an alternative, Stekhoven and Bühlmann (2012) propose a Random Forest (RF)13
approach, which outperforms KNN in data imputation and does not depend on variable
type composition, data dimensionality or –complexity (such as spatio–temporal data) (Feng
et al. 2014, 3592; Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012, 113) .
In contrast to MI and KNN, RF is a non–parametric approach, which means that no
specification of a parametric model or tuning parameters such as KNN’s distance measure
is necessary (Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012, 112–114). This non–parametric approach is
an advantage since selecting an inappropriate imputation model or the incorrect tuning
parameter can strogly affect the performance of the imputation method (Stekhoven and
Bühlmann 2012, 112).
According to Stekhoven and Bühlmann (2012), the RF algorithm for data imputation
works as follows. At the beginning, the dataset is split into four parts for an arbitrarily
variable X that includes missing values: first, the observed values of X; second, the missing
values of X; and finally, the observed and missing values of the remaining variables besides
X, respectively (Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012, 113). As a first step, all variables in the
dataset are sorted according to the number of missing values, where the starting point
is the variable with the lowest amount of missing data (Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012,
113). Thereafter, the missing values in the dataset are initially guessed; for example by
12Note that despite the application of a Bayesian model in the subsequent analysis, I
do not apply a Bayesian imputation technique here since they rely on the Expectation
Maximization (EM) algorithm, whose prognosis accuracy is found to be lower by Jerez et
al. (2010) than the one of machine learning methods (Gelman et al. 2013, 454; Jerez et al.
2010, 111–113; King et al. 2001, 55; Kong et al. 1994, 278).
13A RF classifier is defined as a “[...] a classifier consisting of a collection of
tree–structured classifiers {h(x,Θk), k = 1, ...} where the {Θk} are independent identi-
cally distributed random vectors and each tree casts a unit vote for the most popular class
at input x” (Breiman 2001, 6).
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mean imputation or any another imputation method (Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012, 113).
Subsequently, an RF is fitted for each variable X using its observed observations as labels
and the observed values of the other variables in the dataset as predictors (Stekhoven and
Bühlmann 2012, 113). The missing values of X are then predicted by applying the trained
RF to the missing observations of the remaining variables (Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012,
113). Finally, the previously by initial guessing imputed dataset is updated by using the
newly predicted values for the missings in each variable X (Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012,
113). The algorithm stops when the difference between the updated (imputed) dataset and
the roughly imputed dataset increases (Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012, 113).
Since the RF approach fits with the structure of my dataset and does not require the
(often incorrect) specification of an imputation model or any kind of tuning parameter,
I use the missForest R–package provided by Stekhoven and Bühlmann (2012) for data
imputation14
14missForest is – similar to Stekhoven and Bühlmann’s (2012) experiments – applied
to a dataset that includes transformed and untransformed variables like interaction terms
and dummy variables (Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012, 114–115). This procedure is in line
with the recommendations of King et al. (2001), van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn
(2011) and von Hippel (2009) to first transform, then impute (although the imputed values
of the transformed variables can be very unintuitive) (King et al. 2001, 57; van Buuren
and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011, 22; von Hippel 2009, 282–290). This is because they
find that a) the exclusion of variables from imputation that are part of the statistical
model and b) imputation of only nontransformed data biases regression results when a
parametric imputation method is applied (King et al. 2001, 57; van Buuren and Groothuis-
Oudshoorn 2011, 22; von Hippel 2009, 265–271). Despite the fact that missForest is a
non-parametric imputation method, I will follow this advice since interactions and other
(non-linear) transformations are considered by missForest and can thus be included in
the imputation procedure to avoid biased estimates (Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012, 112;
Shah et al. 2014, 764; Doove et al. 2014, 93).
The imputation dataset further includes variables that are included in some regression
models, but not in others (such as the variables used for the robustness checks). However,
they are considered in the imputation process since observed values in some of these vari-
ables can be useful to predict missing values in other variables (King et al. 2001, 58). In
addition, the dataset is reduced to cases of SGP violations for the analysis after imputation
because the complete dataset is necessary for descriptive statistics that require variance
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The RF algorithm and the missForest–package uses an out–of–bag–error (OOB)–estimate
to determine imputation error (Breiman 2001, 11; Stekhoven and Bühlmann 2012, 112)15.
The calculation ofOOB–estimates differs for continuous and categorical variables (Stekhoven
and Bühlmann 2012, 113). For continuous variables, the normalized root mean square
error (NRMSE)16 is provided, whereas the proportion of falsely classified entries (PFC)
over the missing observations (= δF ) is computed for categorical variables (Stekhoven and
Bühlmann 2012, 113–114). Generally, a good performance of RF yields a NRMSE/PFC
value close to 0, whereas a value around 1 indicates a poor performance (Stekhoven and
Bühlmann 2012, 114). For this project’s dataset, the overall NRMSE is equal to 0.03,
while the PFS is 0.00. This means that there is an imputation error of 3% for continuous
variables and a 0% error for categorical variables, which indicates a good imputation per-
formance of RF for this dataset. After the description of the data imputation process, I
will now continue with the explanation of my statistical model.
between violations and non–violations, such as Table 1.
The only variables whose values are not imputed are both EDP measures, because for
this variable, missing values only occur for countries that were not yet members of the EU
at a given year and imputing non–existent values is not possible (King et al. 2001, 59).
In order to ascertain that the imputation procedure did not lead to a bias in the analysis
results by not conditioning on Y , I re-ran the analysis using complete cases because missing
values in both EDP variables and Eurobarometer indicators occur for the same countries
and years (von Hippel 2009, 266). As the absence of observations in both EDP variables
does not depend on them itself – given that they are only due to non–EU membership at
a certain point in time – listwise deletion does not introduce any bias in these analysis
results in this special case (Van Buuren Van Buuren). However, this alternative procedure
did not lead to any change in the results.
15For a further detailed explanation of the OOB–error estimate, see Breiman (2001).
16The NRMSE is defined by
NRMSE =
√√√√((mean(X true˘X imp)2)
var(X true) (6.1)
, where X true is the complete and X imp is the imputed data matrix (Stekhoven and
Bühlmann 2012, 113–114).
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7 Method: Binary Time–Series Cross–Sectional
Data Analysis
7.1 Characteristics of Binary Time–Series Cross–Sectional
Data
The European Union comprises twenty–eight memberstates, while the Euro as a means of
payment was introduced in 2002 and is currently used by nineteen memberstates (European
Union 2018b). Nevertheless, the SGP applies to all EU states, not only the Eurozone
members (European Union 2008). This investigation’s dataset is an unbalanced time–series
dataset that includes data of 25 countries and 16 years. Because I am interested in the
determinants of sanctioning by the European Commission, the dependent variable is a
binary variable taking the value of 1 if an EDP is initiated and 0 otherwise.
By consisting of observations for both different countries and years and the binary
dependent variable, the data can be classified as BTSCS data (Beck et al. 1998, 1260–1262;
Beck 2001a, 111–273; Beck 2001b, 271). According to Beck et al. (1998) and Beck (2001a;
2001b), BTSCS data can be described by
P (yi,t = 1) = f(xi,tβ); i = 1...N ; t = 1...T (7.1)
where yi,t is the (observed) binary dependent variable, xit is a vector of independent
variables (both indexed by unit i and time t), and f is either a logistic or standard normal
cumulative distribution function (cdf) (Beck et al. 1998, 1260–1262; Wooldridge 2002,
457–458; Wooldridge 2009, 575–576)1.
1Note that there is a distinction between panel and (B)TSCS data: while panel data are
sampled repeated cross–section data where units (usually countries) are only observed for a
few times, (B)TSCS data consist of non–sampled, fixed units (Beck 2001a, 113; Beck 2001b,
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Dealing with BTCS data bears several methodological challenges: First, the errors
can be contemporaneously correlated, which means that the errors of two different units
are associated for a given point in time (Beck and Katz 1995, 636). This problem can
occur when – for example – the economies of two countries are linked or a common “time
shock” affects all units in a given year (Beck and Katz 1995, 636; Shor et al. 2007, 166).
Contemporaneous correlation in BTSCS data violates the assumption of independence of
observations of logit or probit models (Beck et al. 1998, 1261–1263). Consequently, the
application of these models to BTSCS data leads to incorrect standard errors and statistical
tests as well as a loss of information in the data (Beck and Katz 1995, 636; Beck et al.
1998, 1261–1263; Beck 2001a, 128–130; Shor et al. 2007, 165–172)2.
Second, the error variances of the units (usually countries) in BTSCS can differ, which
is called “panel heteroskedasticity” or “unit heteroskedasticity” (Beck and Katz 1995, 636;
Shor et al. 2007, 172). Panel heteroskedasticity in a linear model yields unbiased, but
inefficient estimates (Yatchew and Griliches 1985, 135–137). By contrast, for a binary
outcome models like a probit model, in constrast, heteroskedasticity is more problematic
(Keele and Park 2005, 1–6; Yatchew and Griliches 1985, 135–138). To understand why
that is, recall that the underlying assumption of a probit model is that the error term it
takes a standard normal distribution Φ with constant variance σ (which is equal to 1),
which implies homoskedasticity (Greene 2012, 726; Keele and Park 2005, 6). Given this
assumption, a probit model can be written as
P{yit = 1} = Φ(xitβ
σ
) (7.2)
From this term, it becomes obvious that if there is heteroskedasticity – i.e. σ is not
constantly equal to 1 in a probit model – the estimate βˆ = βˆ
σ
is inconsistent and even
biased if not appropriately modeled (Keele and Park 2005, 6; Yatchew and Griliches 1985,
135–138).
Third, the number of countries in TSCS/BTSCS data is rather small, usually 10 to 50
273). When using panel data, the main interest is in the whole population rather than in
the observed sample (Beck 2001a, 113; Beck 2001b, 273). For (B)TSCS, in contrast, the
focus is on the observed units, simply because resampling countries is not possible (Beck
2001a, 113; Beck 2001b, 273).
2Unfortunately, applying a formal test for cross–section dependence like the
Breusch–Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test is not possible for non–linear models since this
test assumes a linear model (Hsiao et al. 2012, 254).
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observations on 10 to 50 countries (Beck and Katz 2007, 183)3. Such small samples can
be a problem for (frequentist) Maximum–Likelihood (ML) estimation since consistency,
normality and efficiency of the ML estimator only hold if the sample size n increases up
to infinity (King 1989, 77–83; Long 1997, 53–54). If this large n condition is not met, the
sampling distribution of the ML estimator – which is required for the computation of confi-
dence intervals – is unknown (Dixon 2002, 1; Long 1997, 53–54). Applying ML estimators
on BTSCS data may therefore yield incorrect confidence intervals unless bootstrapping
methods to simulate this unknown sampling distribution are applied (Dixon 2002, 1).
Over time, a number of different techniques have been proposed to analyze BTSCS
data: on the one hand, the standard solution to the problem of contemporaneous correla-
tion in BTSCS data is provided by Beck et al. (1998), who propose to add kt˘t0 temporal
dummies to the logit or probit model (Beck et al. 1998, 1267–1270; Leblang 1999, 606;
Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003, 848; Pang 2010, 470–471). This approach can also be com-
bined with robust standard errors to account for the problem of panel heteroskedasticity in
BTSCS data (Beck et al. 1998, 1283). Unfortunately, their approach suffers from a number
of drawbacks: first, robust standard errors are known to only correct model missspecifica-
tion such as an omitted variable bias or fundamental heteroskedasticity (King and Roberts
2015, 159–165). Second, factors that determine country–level differences – which usually
hold interest in BTSCS analyses – remain ignored (Beck 2001a, 113; Beck 2001b, 273).
Even worse, accounting for country–level effects via adding country–fixed effects is not
possible in non–linear models since this would lead to biased estimates due to the “inci-
dental parameter problem”4 (Greene 2012, 627–628; Lee 2016, 179–180; Wooldridge 2002,
3For example, Baerg and Hallerberg’s (2016) sample consists of 15 EU member states,
Leblang (1999) focuses on 55 to 76 developing countries and Hallerberg (2002) tests his
hypotheses on OECD countries only, which were less than 35 countries in the postwar
period (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016, 979–980; Hallerberg 2002, 792; Leblang 1999, 606;
OECD 2017).
4The “incidental parameter problem” occurs when T is fixed and N →∞ (Greene 2012,
659; Wooldridge 2002, 484–491). This is because the number of parameters to be estimated
will increase with the sample size and their estimation is solely based on the T observations
(Greene 2012, 659; Lee 2016, 179–180; Wooldridge 2002, 484). If T is fixed and small, the
asymptotic variance of the maximum likelihood estimator does not decrease and results in
inconsistent β parameters for a fixed effects probit model when using maximum likelihood
estimation (Greene 2012, 659; Lee 2016, 179–180; Wooldridge 2002, 484).
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484–491). Third, according to Carter and Signorino (2010), the approach often leads to
inefficiency and separation since the inclusion of time dummies increases the number of
parameters in the model and their values may perfectly be associated with values of either
0 or 1 of the dependent variable y 5 (Carter and Signorino 2010, 275–276).
On the other hand, multi–level models became increasingly popular to model (B)TSCS
data (Beck and Katz 2007; Raffalovich and Chung 2014; Shor et al. 2007). This is because
instead of modeling BTSCS as grouped duration data6, they can be regarded as non–nested
multi–level data where observations are nested within countries and within years (Beck
et al. 1998, 1264–1270; Carter and Signorino 2010, 290; Gelman and Hill 2006, 241–244).
Consequently, heterogeneity can be found on both the country and year dimension (Pang
2010, 473). In fact, both contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity are inherent
parts of multi–level models that are explicitly modeled, which makes them ideal for the
application on (B)TSCS data (De Leeuw and Meijer 2008, 13–14; Pang 2010, 470–475;
Shor et al. 2007, 165–173).
A number of studies have proposed the application of linear multi–level models on con-
tinuous TSCS data and assessed their performance compared with standard approaches
(Beck and Katz 2007, Gelman and Hill 2006, Hedeker and Gibbons 2006, Fahrmeir et al.
2013, Raffalovich and Chung 2014, Shor et al. 2007). Unfortunately, modeling contempo-
raneous correlation is – with the exception of Shor et al. (2007) – usually ignored, despite
the fact that it yields too small standard errors and confidence intervals, which eventually
affects hypothesis testing (Beck et al. 1998, 1261–1264; Beck 2001a; Beck 2001b; Pang
2010, 488–489; Shor et al. 2007, 165–172). Furthermore, evidence is limited for BTSCS
data, despite the severe consequences of unmodeled panel heteroskedasticity in non–linear
5An alternative technique to the Beck et al. (1998) approach proposed by Carter and
Signorino (2010) is adding cubic polynomials t, t2 and t3 to the regression equation, which
avoids the Beck et al. (1998) approaches’ problems of inefficiency and complete separation
(Carter and Signorino 2010, 271–278). However, their technique also only addresses the
problem of temporal dependence, but not panel heteroskedasticity (Carter and Signorino
2010, 271–273).
6Beck et al. (1998) as well as Carter and Signorino (2010) see BTSCS data as grouped
duration data where the hazard rate – namely, the likelihood of “failure” of a unit – is
dependent on both independent variables and time, which makes it possible to account
for temporal dependence in the regression model (Beck et al. 1998, 1264–1270; Carter and
Signorino 2010, 290).
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models (Keele and Park 2005, 6; Yatchew and Griliches 1985, 135–137).
One exception is Pang (2010) who proposes to model both heterogeneity and serial
correlation in BTSCS data with a Bayesian multi–level probit model with a pth–order
autoregressive AR(p) error process and a country– and year–level intercept (Pang 2010,
470–475). One reason speaking for a Bayesian approach is that when dealing with BTSCS
data in the EU/Eurozone context, the data already constitute of observations from a
“population” of EU states, so the principle of classical frequentist statistics of drawing
inferences from long–run repeated random sampling is inapplicable (Western and Jackman
1994, 412–416). Another reason is related to sample size: as already mentioned above, the
dataset includes 25 countries only. In that context, Stegmüller (2013) has shown that for
sample sizes of less than 30 countries, Bayesian multi–level probit models result in correct
standard errors and confidence intervals compared with frequentist multi–level models,
which usually require bootstrapping methods to properly compute these quantities in case
of a small sample (Dixon 2002, 1; Stegmüller 2013, 755–758). However, despite the fact
that Pang (2010) applies her model to some empirical examples, she does not provide
a comparison of the performance of her model to the approach of Beck et al. (1998)
or frequentist multi–level models in her Monte Carlo simulation (Pang 2010, 482–484).
Therefore, the question of how well Bayesian BTSCS approaches perform compared with
frequentist models for BTSCS data remains unanswered.
In order to overcome the challenges of analyzing BTSCS data in this project, I present
a Bayesian multi–level probit model with a BTSCS specification 7 (from now onwards re-
ferred to as BMLP BTSCS model). Moreover, to answer the methodological question of
which model is most suitable for small–sample BTSCS data analyses – such as in case of
EU/Eurozone research – I compare the BMLP BTSCS’ performance to five other mod-
els used for BTSCS data analysis in the Political Science literature – including Beck et
al.’s (1998) BTSCS standard approach and frequentist multi–level probit models as rec-
ommended in standard multi–level textbooks – in a Monte Carlo experiment (Beck et al.
1998, 1261–1264; Fahrmeir et al. 2013, 350–391; Gelman and Hill 2006, 241–244; 289–290;
Hedeker and Gibbons 2006; Pang 2010, 474–475; Shor et al. 2007, 170–172).
Because the BMLP BTSCS model a) accounts for both contemporaneous correlation
and panel heteroskedasticity via its country– and year–level random intercepts and b)
7A BTSCS specification means that the model includes both a country– and a year–level
random intercept to model both contemporaneous correlation and panel heteroskedasticity
(Pang 2010, 470; Shor et al. 2007, 171–172).
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Bayesian models have been found to outperform frequentist multi–level models for samples
with few countries, I expect the BMLP BTSCS model to result in both unbiased estimates
and correct standard errors for small samples compared with the other aforementioned
BTSCS modeling techniques (Stegmüller 2013, 755–758; Pang 2010, 470; Shor et al. 2007,
171–172). The following section will discuss this model in further detail.
7.2 Modeling Binary Time–Series Cross–Sectional Data:
A Bayesian Multi–Level Approach
The BTSCS structure of the data used here can also be regarded as non–nested multi–level
data where observations are clustered in both country×year levels (Gelman and Hill 2006,
241–244). As for “nested” multi–level data structures (for example, where individuals
are nested in groups), the variation of the levels (among countries and over years) is of
interest for BTSCS data that can accordingly be modeled (Gelman and Hill 2006, 241–244;
289–290; Shor et al. 2007, 170–171). Due to the data’s multi–level structure and the
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I follow Stegmüller (2013) and choose a
Bayesian multi–level probit model (Stegmüller 2013, 749).
The decision for a Bayesian approach stems from two advantages: from a method-
ological perspective, Bayesian models – in contrast to ML estimators – do not require
bootstrapping to obtain correct standard errors and confidence intervals for small samples
like the dataset used for this investigation (Dixon 2002, 1; Stegmüller 2013, 755–758).
This is because the Bayesian approach is based on multiplying the likelihood with a prior
to obtain the so–called “posterior distribution” (Gelman and Hill 2006, 392). From the
posterior, inferences are then summarized from by random draws (Gelman and Hill 2006,
392). The posterior distribution is a real probability distribution, so Bayesian “credible
intervals” and “standard errors” can be computed without referring to a hypothetical sam-
pling distribution since they are simply the corresponding quantiles/standard deviation of
that distribution (Lee et al. 2017, 868; Stegmüller 2013, 750).
More substantially, note that the data already include all of the available observations
from a population of EU member states that have violated the SGP, so the application of
frequentist methods that are based on a sampling notion is not very reasonable (Western
and Jackman 1994, 412–415). By being based on the posterior probability distribution,
the Bayesian approach does not rely on this notion: Bayesian credible intervals yield the
posterior probability that a coefficient lies in that interval without any reference to a
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(hypothetical) population of countries (Stegmüller 2013, 750; Western and Jackman 1994,
412). Consequently, Bayesian models are more reasonable for data constituting of countries
that – for example – belong to certain unique organizations (Western and Jackman 1994,
412).
I will apply a probit instead of a logit model due to the differences in data augmentation
between these two models (Jackman 2009, 393). Given the conditional independence of
the data, in line with Jackman (2009) the likelihood for the parameter estimates β for a
binary response model can be described by
L(β; y,X) = p(y|X, β) =
n∏
i=1
F (xiβ)yi [1˘F (xiβ)]1˘yi (7.3)
where for yi = 1, the likelihood is pii = F (xiβ), whereas for yi = 0, it equals pii =
1˘F (xiβ) (Jackman 2009, 380). The problem for binary response models is that, given
this likelihood, there is no conjugate prior for β (Jackman 2009, 380). However, the probit
model can be turned into a linear regression conditional on latent data, a process called
data augmentation (Jackman 2009, 380). Via this process, running a Gibbs sampler to
conduct Bayesian analysis is feasible (Jackman 2009, 380). Data augmentation is based on
the latent variable approach of binary response models (Jackman 2009, 380). For example,
a probit model can be written as a latent variable regression model with normal errors and
a censored latent dependent variable y∗i :
y∗i = xiβ + i, i ∼ N (0, 1) ∀i = 1, ..., n (7.4)
with the censoring rule yi = 0⇒ y∗i < τ and y∗i = 1⇒≥ τ (Jackman 2009, 380).
Due to the latent data y∗ = (y∗1, ...y∗n), it is possible to work with the “data augmented
posterior density”, p(β|y∗, y,X), instead of computing the posterior p(β|y,X) directly
(which would be much harder for the Gibbs sampler) (Jackman 2009, 381). Sampling
from the posterior for β via an augmented Gibbs sampler proceeds as follows: first, the
augmented data y∗ are generated from the predicted density p(y∗|β, y,X) (Jackman 2009,
381). Subsequently, β is sampled from its conditional density given the augmented data
and observed data p(β|y∗, y,X) (Jackman 2009, 381). For the probit model, the conditional
density of β equals p(β|y∗, X) since conditioning on y is not necessary given y∗ (Jackman
2009, 381).
This process is easier to implement for the probit model for two reasons: first, the
normal density underlying the probit model implies that
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y∗i |xi, β˜, yi = 0 ∼ N (xiβ˜, 1)I(y∗i < 0) (7.5)
y∗i |xi, β˜, yi = 1 ∼ N (xiβ˜, 1)I(y∗i > 0) (7.6)
where I(·) is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if its argument is true
and zero otherwise, in order to induce truncated normal sampling (Jackman 2009, 381).
Second, since the model for the latent variable y∗i is a normal linear regression model, it is
possible to use normal priors for β, β ∼ N (b0, B0) because it is the conjugate prior for the
normal model (Jackman 2009, 381). Furthermore, this enables one to use standard results
on the Bayesian analysis of a linear regression problem (Jackman 2009, 381).
However, in case of a logit model, the latent variable y∗i has logistic densities with mean
xiβ and is truncated given the observed yi (Jackman 2009, 393). In contrast to the probit
model, the problem here is that there is no corresponding conjugate prior for β (Jackman
2009, 393). Using a normal prior for β while having a logistic density for y∗i leads to a
conditional distribution for β, p(β|y∗i , X), which is no standard distribution (Jackman 2009,
393). Because it is more difficult for the Gibbs sampler to sample from this distribution
(although there are solutions for this problem, see Jackman 2009), I rely on the multi–level
probit model due to its smoother implementation.
Since a multi–level approach makes it possible to model the variation of the country–
and year–levels, I will apply a Bayesian multi–level probit model with a BTSCS specifi-
cation (henceforth referred to as BMLP BTSCS model) for the analysis. My model is a
modification of BTSCS approaches presented by Pang (2010)8 and Shor et al. (2007)9,
but deals with the problems that are associated with panel heteroskedasticity in N , con-
temporaneously–correlated errors in T and a small N simultaneously by including both a
country– and year–specific random intercept and the application of a Bayesian approach
(Pang 2010, 470–475; Shor et al. 2007, 170–172; Stegmüller 2013, 755–758). Thus, the
BMLP BTSCS should result in both unbiased estimates and correct standard errors even
for samples with few countries.
8Pang (2010) presents a Bayesian multi–level probit model that accounts for country–
and year–level heterogeneity but also serial correlation in the individual errors (Pang 2010,
470–475).
9Shor et al. (2007) present a Bayesian multi–level linear regression model that models
both panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation (Shor et al. 2007, 165–172).
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Using the latent variable formulation of Greenberg (2008) and McCulloch (2003) and
the error term formulation of Gelman and Hill (2006), my model can be described by
y∗i,t = µ+Xitβ + αi + γt + it; i = 1...N ; t = 1...T (7.7)
where y∗i,t is an underlying latent variable indexed by country i and year t; αi and γt
are the country– and year–specific random error term parameters, respectively, with
αi ∼ N (0, σ2α) (7.8)
γt ∼ N (0, σ2γ); (7.9)
(Gelman and Hill 2006, 263–265; McCulloch 2003, 2–4; Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2005, 304;
Shor et al. 2007, 170). Note that if the model has an overall intercept besides a country–
and year–level error, the means of the latter have to be equal to 0 to make the model
identifiable (Gelman and Hill 2006, 380–381; Pang 2010, 475) 10. Moreover, αi and γt are
independent from it and xit (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2005, 304). Finally, the model can be
written as GLMM by
P{yit = 1|α, γ} = P{Xitβ + αi + γt + it > 0} (7.10)
P{yit = 1|α, γ} = Φ{Xitβ + αi + γt} (7.11)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution link function that makes the
model appropriate for binary outcome variables (Gelman and Hill 2006, 264–265; McCul-
loch 2003, 4).
The TSCS component of the model is the time–varying error parameter γt (Goldstein
1986; Shor et al. 2007, 170). Including γt makes it possible to account for contemporaneous
correlation in the form of “time shocks” that affect all countries in a given year (Shor et al.
2007, 171–172). Moreover, the mean of αi and γt is set equal to 0 since the constant term
has been included as µ–parameter in the model (Gelman and Hill 2006, 381)11. Finally, β
10Note that without the baseline constant, the probabilities predicted by the model only
depend on the relative values of the parameters (Gelman and Hill 2006, 315–316).
11This is because for non–nested models, one can either include a constant term in
the model while setting the mean of αi and γt to zero or define a mean parameter for
60
is a (non–random) coefficient with a single independent variable xit that varies across time
and units, and it is the error term of level one (Shor et al. 2007, 170–171).
From equation 8 to 12, one can see that the BMLP BTSCS considers both panel het-
eroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Therefore, it should thus yield unbiased
estimates and correct credible intervals. Due to the Bayesian approach, this should also
be the case for samples with a small number of countries (Stegmüller 2013, 755–758).
Instead of relying on repeatable experiments, the Bayesian approach multiplies the
likelihood function – which is defined as the probability of the data given the parameters
and independent variables – with a prior distribution (Gelman and Hill 2006, 388–392;
Western and Jackman 1994, 412–416). This prior distribution represents non–sample prior
information and needs to be selected for all parameters included in the model (Stegmüller
2013, 750; Western and Jackman 1994, 415). In multi–level models, priors for both the β
coefficient– and the µ constant term – parameters as well at the hyperparameters ση and
σν need to be selected (Gelman and Hill 2006, 346).
For the selection of the β and µ parameter priors, I follow Gelman and Hill (2006),
Martin (2008) and Pang (2010) and choose so called “noninformative” priors like β ∼
(0, 0.001) and µ ∼ (0, 0.001) (Gelman and Hill 2006, 347–380; Martin 2008, 507; Pang
2010, 482; Shor et al. 2007, 170; Stegmüller 2013, 751).
In contrast to the linear model as proposed by Shor et al. (2007), choosing a non–informative
uniform prior for αi and γt is not possible in a non–linear model since this would make
the αi/γt–parameters equivalent to to frequentist fixed effects, which are known to suf-
fer from the “incidental parameter problem” that yields biased estimates in non–linear
models (Hahn 2004, 137; Lee 2016, 181). However, when applying a Bayesian approach
with non–uniform priors, the incidental parameter problem is no longer present since the
unit–varying random effects – in constrast to the frequentist framework – are estimated as
a random variable (Lee 2016, 180–181).
For the choice of a non–uniform prior, I follow Lee (2016) and Gelman (2006), I choose
p(σα) ∼ 1/σα and p(σγ) ∼ 1/σγ as hyperparameter priors which avoids making αi and γt
fixed effects and therefore the incidental parameter problem (Gelman 2006, 521; Lee 2016,
181). Accordingly, the Bayesian multi–level probit is equivalent to the frequentist random
effects model and results in unbiased parameter estimates (Lee 2016, 181–184).
the country– and year–specific random effects without a constant since the inclusion of a
constant term in more than one place leads to nonidentifiability (Gelman and Hill 2006,
381).
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7.3 Monte Carlo Experiment
Thus far, the superiority of the BMLP BTSCS model is merely a theoretical expectation
since there is surprisingly little empirical evidence of this in the methodological literature.
Therefore, I test the performance of the BMLP BTSCS model compared with the per-
formance of five other models used for BTSCS data analysis, which shall be described in
further detail in the following section.
7.3.1 Models to be compared
The Monte Carlo experiment will compare six models overall in terms of bias and correct
standard errors since panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation are known
to affect these two quantities in a probit model. Besides the BMLP BTSCS model, five
additional models are considered in the model comparison12:
The first model is a frequentist pooled probit model (referred to as Probit Model in the
experiment) that ignores both panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation
(as used by Hallerberg 2002) (Hallerberg 2002, 798). I expect the estimates of this model
to be biased and standard errors/confidence intervals to be too small.
The second model is Beck et al.’s (1998) BTSCS time dummy approach (labeled as B
& K here) that neglects country–level differences13 (Beck et al. 1998, 1264–1270). Due to
its ignorance of panel heteroskedasticity, I expect its estimates to be biased, but standard
errors/confidence intervals to be correct.
The third and fourth model are both a Bayesian (BMLP) and a frequentist multi–level
probit model (Freq. MLP) with a country–level intercept that both ignore contempora-
neous correlation, as suggested by Fahrmeir et al. (2013) (Fahrmeir et al. 2013, 389–391;
Pang 2010, 488). As such, I expect their estimates to be unbiased, but standard errors/-
confidence intervals and Bayesian credible intervals to be too small. Given the findings
12The Bayesian models were run using the R–packages coda and R2jags, while the
package lme4 was used for the frequentist multi–level models (Bates et al. 2015); Plummer
et al. 2006; Su and Yajima 2015).
13The approach of Carter and Signorino (2010) is not considered in the experiment since
the time–dummy approach of Beck et al. (1998) is still the most frequently used one
(2729 vs. 1081 Google Scholar citations (Google 2018)). The spline approach of Beck et
al. (1998) is not part of the model comparison because it is relatively unknown among
political scientists (Carter and Signorino 2010, 278).
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of Stegmüller (2013), I particularly expect standard errors and confidence intervals of the
frequentist model to be smaller than the credible intervals of the Bayesian model for a low
number of countries (< 30) (Stegmüller 2013, 755–758).
The fifth model is a frequentist multi–level probit model with a country– and year–level
intercept (as applied by Baerg and Hallerberg (2016) and denoted as Freq. MLP BTSCS
here) to assess the difference between classical and Bayesian BTSCS models for small
sample sizes. While this model accounts for both panel heteroskedasticity and contempo-
raneous correlation, I expect its estimates to be unbiased, but credible intervals to be small
for less than 30 countries14 (Stegmüller 2013, 755–758.).
The last and most important model included for comparison is the Bayesian multi–level
probit model with a country– and year–specific random intercept (BMLP BTSCS). Since
the BMLP BTSCS – as explained above – simultaneously accounts for panel heteroskedas-
ticity and contemporaneous correlation and the Bayesian approach is suitable for samples
including few countries, it should result in unbiased estimates and correct credible inter-
vals15 (Stegmüller 2013, 755–758).
7.3.2 Data Generating Process
In order to test whether the BMLP BTSCS model captures the peculiarities of BTSCS
data better than other techniques, I will set up data with a variance–covariance matrix
that is panel heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated (Beck and Katz 1995, 636;
Beck et al. 1998, 1261–1263; Pang 2010, 472–475; Shor et al. 2007, 171–173).
Using the error component notation of Wallace and Hussain (1969)16, the data gener-
14Due to convergence issues, the continuous independent variables have been scaled
(Long 1997, 59–60). This usually solves the problem of imprecise gradient estimates (Long
1997, 59–60).
15All Bayesian models were both run with three chains iterating 8000 times where half of
the interations where discarded as a burn–in and the thinning interval was set equal to 4,
leaving 1000 iterations saved (Gelman et al. 2013, 282–283; Shor et al. 2007, 173). Chain
covergence was confirmed for all parameters via the Gelman–Rubin Rˆ provided by R’s
coda–package (Cowles and Carlin 1996, 884–885; Gelman et al. 2013, 284–285; Plummer
et al. 2006; Shor et al. 2007, 173).
16Note that this notation is equivalent to the varying–coefficient notation previously
used in this chapter (Gelman and Hill 2006, 262–265). However, I use the error component
notation here since it simplifies the derivation of the data generation processes’ covariance
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ating process of the Monte Carlo experiment can be described as follows:
y∗it = µ+ βxit + it; i = 1...N ; t = 1...T (7.12)
it = αi + γt + ωit (7.13)
αi ∼ N (0, σ2αi); (7.14)
γt ∼ N (0, σ2γ); (7.15)
ωit ∼ N (0, σ2ω); (7.16)
where y∗i,t is an underlying latent variable indexed by country i and year t; µ is the over-
all intercept set equal to 1, β is some regression parameter of the time– and unit–varying
independent variable xit which takes the value of 0.3 in the experiment 17, and it is the
composite error term (Greenberg 2008, 123; McCulloch 2003, 4; Shor et al. 2007, 170;
Singer and Willett 2003, 247; Wallace and Hussain 1969, 56–58). Here, αi accounts for
the country–level errors, γt for the year–level errors and ωit for the (individual) coun-
try–year–level 1 errors for which the following assumptions are imposed (Shor et al. 2007,
171; Singer and Willett 2003, 244–247; Wallace and Hussain 1969, 56–58):
1. E[αiαi′ ] = 0 for i 6= i′, namely the (country–level) errors of different countries are
uncorrelated (Wallace and Hussain 1969, 56–58).
2. [Eγtγt′ ] = 0 for t 6= t′, namely the (year–level) errors of different years are uncorre-
lated (Wallace and Hussain 1969, 56–58).
3. [Eωitωi′t] = E[ωit′ωit] = [Eωi′t′ωit] = 0 for i 6= i′ and t 6= t′, namely the (level 1)
errors are uncorrelated for different countries within a given year, for different years
within a given country and for different countries and different years (Wallace and
Hussain 1969, 56–58).
matrix.
17In line with Gelman and Hill (2006), I did not set the parameter values to either 0 or
1 to avoid masking programming errors (Gelman and Hill 2006, 363–364).
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Recall that panel heteroskedasticity implies a constant variance over time within coun-
tries, but a different one between countries (Beck and Katz 1995, 636; Shor et al. 2007, 172).
Thus, in order to induce panel heteroskedasticity in the experiment, the country–level error
variances σ2α will be manipulated by varying with the independent variable xit and some
constant ψ to induce heteroskedasticity such that σ2αi can be defined by
σ2αi = e
xit·ψ, i = 1, 2, 3...N ; (7.17)
(Beck and Katz 1995, 636; Carsey and Harden 2013, 107–108; Shor et al. 2007, 172–173;
Singer and Willett 2003, 249–250)18. For the experiment conducted here, ψ is set to
0.8, whereby larger values of the independent variable result in larger country–level error
variances (Carsey and Harden 2013, 107–108). Manipulating σ2α also leads to different
levels of within–country autocorrelation of errors of different years across countries (Shor
et al. 2007, 171; Singer and Willett 2003, 249).
Since the outcome variable needs to only take binary values based on the value of
the latent variable y∗it and the threshold 0, equation (8) is plugged in a standard normal
cumulative distribution function yielding
P{yit = 1} = P{xitβ + it > 0} (7.18)
P{yit = 1} = Φ{xitβ} (7.19)
(Gelman and Hill 2006, 264–265; McCulloch 2003, 4; Pang 2010, 474–475).
The crucial element to illustrate the characteristics of the BTSCS data created by the
above described data generating process is theNT×NT covariance matrix of the composite
errors it, where N equals the number of countries and T the number of years (Wallace
and Hussain 1969, 56–58). This covariance matrix is defined as
∑
= σ2ωINT + σ2αiD + σ
2
γB (7.20)
where σ2ωINT is the level 1–error variance component, σ2αiD the (heteroskedastic) coun-
try–level error variance component and σ2γB the year–level error variance component (Beck
and Katz 1995, 636; Carsey and Harden 2013, 107–108; Shor et al. 2007, 172–173; Singer
18Using the exponential function in Equation (13) prevents negative variance values
(Carsey and Harden 2013, 107–108).
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and Willett 2003, 249–250; Wallace and Hussain 1969, 56–58). In order to illustrate how
panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation are included in ∑, let N = 3 (=
three countries) and T = 3 (= three years). The covariance matrix ∑ is a 9× 9 matrix of
the following structure19:
∑
=

σ2ω + σ2α1 + σ2γ σ2α1 σ2α1 σ2γ 0 0 σ2γ 0 0
σ2α1 σ
2
ω + σ2α1 + σ2γ σ2α1 0 σ2γ 0 0 σ2γ 0
σ2α1 σ
2
α1 σ
2
ω + σ2α1 + σ2γ 0 0 σ2γ 0 0 σ2γ
σ2γ 0 0 σ2ω + σ2α2 + σ2γ σ2α2 σ2α2 σ2γ 0 0
0 σ2γ 0 σ2α2 σ2ω + σ2α2 + σ2γ σ2α2 0 σ2γ 0
0 0 σ2γ σ2α2 σ2α2 σ2ω + σ2α2 + σ2γ 0 0 σ2γ
σ2γ 0 0 σ2γ 0 0 σ2ω + σ2α3 + σ2γ σ2α3 σ2α3
0 σ2γ 0 0 σ2γ 0 σ2α3 σ2ω + σ2α3 + σ2γ σ2α3
0 0 σ2γ 0 0 σ2γ σ2α3 σ2α3 σ2ω + σ2α3 + σ2γ

Note that ∑ matrix has the following properties:
–– The block submatrices on the main diagonal of∑ reflect the within–country variance–
and covariance of the residuals for different years within the same country (Singer and
Willett 2003, 249–750). The σ2ω+σ2αi +σ
2
γ term on the diagonals of these submatrices
is the correlation of errors for the same country and the same year and indicate the
within–country–variance over time, comprising the level 1–error–, country–error –
and year–error variance parameters (Singer and Willett 2003, 249). It is important
to mention here that the addition of the σ2γ year–error variance parameter is a key
difference between the compound–symmetric covariance matrix design of a classical
random–intercept model where occasions/years (level 1) are seen as nested in units
(countries) and the covariance matrix of (B)TSCS data (Hedeker and Gibbons 2006,
49–52) 20. The non–zero off–diagonals of the submatrices, denoted with σ2αi , indicate
the amount of autocorrelation of errors within a given country that varies across
countries (Shor et al. 2007, 171; Singer and Willett 2003, 249–250).
–– Due to the manipulation described above, the σ2αi country–variance parameters are
unequal between units (which is indicated by the subscripts i = 1, 2, 3...N), thereby
simulating panel heteroskedasticity in BTSCS data (Beck and Katz 1995, 636; Shor
et al. 2007, 172–173).
19For detailed calculation, see Appendix.
20For the classical random intercept model, the diagonals of the submatrices are equal
to σ2ω + σ2α (Hedeker and Gibbons 2006, 49–52).
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–– The σ2γ parameter on the main diagonal of the off–diagonal block matrices of
∑ is
the correlation of errors for different countries and the same year, which reflects the
notion of “contemporaneous correlation” in (B)TSCS data (Beck and Katz 1995, 636;
Beck et al. 1998, 1261–1263; Pang 2010, 471–475; Shor et al. 2007, 172). In contrast
to the country–level error variances σ2αi , σ
2
γ and thus the level of contemporaneous
correlation is assumed to be constant across both time and countries (Beck and Katz
1995, 636). In the experiment, σ2γ takes the value of 0.7, whereby a strong level of
contemporaneous correlation is simulated21.
–– Finally, the 0’s indicate the assumed zero correlation of errors for both different coun-
tries and different years (Wallace and Hussain 1969, 56–58). For this experiment,
σ2ω is set equal to 1 (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2005, 304).
Since BTSCS data typically comprise 10 to 50 observations on between 10 and 50 units,
both N and T vary between 10 and 50 in the experiment (Beck and Katz 2007, 183).
Consequently, the dimension of the NT × NT covariance matrix of the composite errors
will vary accordingly (Wallace and Hussain 1969, 56–58). This allows me to assess the
performance of the BMLP BTSCS compared with frequentist models for a small number
of countries (N < 30) while the errors of T are contemporaneously correlated (Beck and
Katz 1995, 636; Beck et al. 1998, 1261–1263; Maas and Hox 2004, 127–130; Pang 2010,
471–475; Shor et al. 2007, 172; Stegmüller 2013, 748–751). Note that this is an extension
of Stegmüller’s (2013) experiment which only focused on variation in N and intraclass
correlation (Stegmüller 2013, 751).
In sum,∑ reflects both panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation while
N and T vary between 10 and 50, so that the simulated data possess all three key charac-
teristics of (B)TSCS data (Beck and Katz 1995, 635–636; Beck et al. 1998, 1260–1263; Shor
et al. 2007, 171–173; Singer and Willett 2003, 249; Pang 2010, 475). For the experiment,
I follow Shor et al. (2007) and perform 250 Monte Carlo trials (instead of 1,000 or more)
due to the time consuming Bayesian estimators (Shor et al. 2007, 173).
21This scenario is particularly realistic for economies that are closely located to each
other – such as within the European Union – where economic shocks in a given year can
simultaneously affect neighboring countries (Beck and Katz 1995, 636).
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7.3.3 Results
In order to assess each models’ performance in terms of bias and standard errors, I com-
puted several test statistics such as bias, mean–squared error and standard errors of the β
parameters (Carsey and Harden 2013, 97–102; Shor et al. 2007, 174–176)22. In addition, I
present a graphical illustration of the β–coefficients and their confidence/credible intervals.
Absolute Bias
Ignoring panel heteroskedasticity in BTSCS data can lead to incorrect estimates in case
of non–linear models (Yatchew and Griliches 1985, 135–137). To assess each model’s
performance on dealing with that problem, I computed the absolute bias of the coefficients
as |βˆ˘β| as a first test statistic (Carsey and Harden 2013, 97). Consequently, a probit
model that considers panel heteroskedasticity should yield a bias close or equal to 0, while
a model that ignores this problem should exhibit a larger bias. Figure 12 and 1323 show
each model’s average bias variation over N and T , respectively (Carsey and Harden 2013,
97; Shor et al. 2007, 174–176)24.
22Note that the Beck et al. (1998) approach suffered from the problem of separation in
the Monte Carlo analysis which is likely to cause estimation problems, as already pointed
out by Carter and Signorino (2010) (Carter and Signorino 2010, 271–278).
23The plots were created using the R–packages dplyr, gdata and ggplot2 (Warnes et al.
2017; Wickham 2016; Wickham et al. 2017).
24Table 6 (see Appendix) shows the absolute bias of each model’s estimates for each
value of N and T . For the creation of the table, the R–packages dplyr; reshape2;
splitstackshape and xtable were used (Dahl 2016; Mahto 2018; Wickham 2007; Wick-
ham et al. 2017).
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Figure 12: Average Absolute Bias of β–Coefficients for N Ranging from Minimum to
Maximum
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Figure 13: Average Absolute Bias of β–Coefficients for T Ranging from Minimum to Max-
imum
Although all models’ estimates have a fairly small bias (see Table 6 in the Appendix),
the BMLP BTSCS model consistently yields the smallest average bias, regardless of the
size of N or T . It is only slightly larger for very small samples where both N and T are
equal to 10. This indicates that the model deals appropriately with the problem of panel
heteroskedasticity compared with alternative techniques. However, the absolute bias does
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not allow one to draw any conclusions about the efficiency of a parameter estimate (Carsey
and Harden 2013, 98–136).
Mean Squared Error
In contrast to the absolute bias, the Mean Squared Error is both a measure of efficiency (=
variability of the parameter estimate across the Monte Carlo trials) and bias since it puts
more emphasis on variability (Carsey and Harden 2013, 98–136). The MSE of a parameter
estimate is equal to the expectation of its squared deviation from the true parameter value
(which is equal to 0.3 in this experiment), namely MSE = E[(βˆ˘β)2] (Carsey and Harden
2013, 98–99). As for the absolute bias, we want the MSE to be as small as possible for a
well–performing model (Carsey and Harden 2013, 98–99). The average MSEs for N and T
of each of the models to be compared in this experiment are illustrated in Figure 14 and
15 25.
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Figure 14: Average MSE of β–Coefficients for N Ranging from Minimum to Maximum
25The graphs were created using the R–packages dplyr, gdata and ggplot2 (Warnes
et al. 2017; Wickham 2016; Wickham et al. 2017). In addition, Table 7 (see Appendix)
shows the MSE of each model’s estimates for each value of N and T . The table was created
using the R–packages dplyr; reshape2; splitstackshape and xtable were used (Dahl
2016; Mahto 2018; Wickham 2007; Wickham et al. 2017).
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Figure 15: Average MSE of β–Coefficients for T Ranging from Minimum to Maximum
Contrary to the results on absolute bias, the Mean Squared Error for the BMLP BTSCS
model is larger than the one of the pooled probit, Beck et al.’s (1998) standard BTSCS
approach and the two frequentist multi–level models. However, the BMLP BTSCS model’s
MSE decreases with both an increase in N and T : while the MSE is largest for N = 10
and T = 10 (≈ 3.16) compared with all other models, it is equivalent or even smaller for
N = 50 and T = 50 (≈ 0.05).
Standard Errors
The problem of contemporaneous correlation in BTSCS data can lead to incorrect stan-
dard errors and therefore affect hypothesis testing since the assumption of independent
observations in non–linear models is violated (Beck et al. 1998, 1261–1264; Beck 2001a,
128–129; Shor et al. 2007, 165–172). Although we prefer standard errors to be as small as
possible since this reflects a higher confidence of our estimates, smaller standard errors can
be incorrect if there is in fact a high level of variability in the sample (Carsey and Harden
2013, 99–102). Despite being a concept of frequentist statistics, Bayesian “standard er-
rors” as a measure of estimate uncertainty can be derived from the standard deviation of
the posterior distribution (Lee et al. 2017, 868). In order to ascertain whether the BMLP
BTSCS model yields correct standard errors, I follow Carsey and Harden (2013) by apply-
ing the so called “standard deviation” method, which makes it possible to assess whether
the standard errors of a model’s parameter estimate reflect this parameter’s variability
across different samples (Carsey and Harden 2013, 99–102).
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Ideally, the mean of the standard errors calculated in each respective Monte Carlo trial
for each model’s β–coefficient estimate should be close to the standard deviation of the
distribution of the simulated 250 coefficient estimates (Carsey and Harden 2013, 99–102).
This similarity can be assessed by comparing these two quantities (Carsey and Harden
2013, 99–102). In order to facilitate the presentation of the results, I simply subtracted
the models’ average standard errors for each value of N and T from the observed standard
deviation of the coefficient estimates of all Monte Carlo trials such that a value equal to
or close to 0 indicates correct standard errors. Figure 16 and 17 show the variation of this
difference over both N and T 26.
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Figure 16: Average Difference Between the SEs of the β–Coefficients Compared with the
Standard Deviation of the Sampling Distribution for N Ranging from Minimum to Maxi-
mum
26Exact numbers are presented in Table 5 in the Appendix. Also this table was created
with the R–packages dplyr; reshape2; splitstackshape and xtable (Dahl 2016; Mahto
2018; Wickham 2007; Wickham et al. 2017).
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mum
The small values on the y–axis of the results presented in Figure 14 and 1527 reveal that
the coefficient standard errors of all models come close to the true coefficient variability.
This is surprising since pooled probit models are usually known to underestimate coefficient
variability for BTSCS data (Beck et al. 1998, 1263). Furthermore, the coefficients of the
BMLP BTSCS model yields larger standard errors than the other models across all values
of N which means that the estimated variability is larger than the true sample variability
(Shor et al. 2007, 175). However, as Table 8 (see Appendix) shows, this “underconfidence”
diminishes with increasing N and T , even for a small number of countries, i.e. N < 30.
Finally, in order to provide a more intuitive comparison between the various models,
I follow Stegmüller (2013) and present a graphical illustration. Since it is not possible to
present 25 plots for every combination of N and T ranging from 10 to 5028, respectively,
I focus on the results for N = 20 and T = 20, N = 30 and T = 20 and N = 30 and
T = 30 to evaluate the BMLP BTSCS model’s results compared with all other models’
results for N below and equal to the critical value of 30 (Maas and Hox 2004, 127–130;
Stegmüller 2013, 748–751). The reason for the choice of these value combinations is that
they resemble the structure of my dataset and two EU research applications: First, the
27For the creation of the graphs, the R–packages dplyr, gdata and ggplot2 were used
(Warnes et al. 2017; Wickham 2016; Wickham et al. 2017).
28For the remaining figures, see Figures 38 to 42 in the Appendix.
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Eurozone comprises nineteen countries and exists since nineteen years, which both matches
approximately N = 20 and T = 20 (European Union 2018b). Second, the datasets used for
this analysis comprises twenty–five countries and sixteen years, which is similar to N = 30
and T = 20. Third, the EU as a whole currently has twenty–eight members and existed for
twenty–five years, which comes close to the case of N = 30 and T = 30 (European Union
2018a).
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Figure 18: Coefficient Estimates and 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals for N = 20 and
T = 20
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Figure 19: Coefficient Estimates and 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals for N = 30 and
T = 20
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Figure 20: Coefficient Estimates and 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals for N = 30 and
T = 30
Figure 18 to 2029plot both point estimates and 95 % confidence/Bayesian credible inter-
vals of the β parameters of all models. The solid vertical line indicates the true parameter
value of β, 0.3, to make deviations from this value more clear. For N = 20 and T = 20 –
namely a small sample size including panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous cor-
relation – the BMLP BTSCS model’s coefficient is closest to the true value compared with
the coefficients of the other models. Particularly the coefficients of the pooled probit model
and the two frequentist multi–level models deviate from the true parameter value. Similar
to the findings of Pang (2010) and Stegmüller (2013), the BMLP BTSCS model’s credible
intervals are much larger than those of the confidence/credible intervals of the other mod-
els, which makes it less likely to reject a true null hypothesis (Pang 2010, 486–489; Shor
et al. 2007, 176; Stegmüller 2013, 756–758). The same is true for the results where N = 30
and T is either equal to 20 or 30: Figure 17 and 18 show that the point estimate of the
BMLP BTSCS model is closest to the true coefficient value and credible intervals are not
overly confident. This suggest that the BMLP BTSCS model is an appropriate choice for
BTSCS data, particularly for samples with a small N such as Eurozone/EU analyses.
Note that the results of both the frequentist multi–level model (country–level random
intercept only) and the frequentist Model with the BTSCS specification are contrary to
the expectation: Despite accounting for panel heteroskedasticity, both models yield biased
29The figures were created using R’s ggplot2 and tidyr (Wickham 2016; Wickham and
Henry 2018).
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estimates, while the frequentist multi–level BTSCS model’s confidence intervals are much
smaller than expected. This is most likely due to convergence problems that persisted
during the experiment despite scaling the independent variable (Long 1997, 59–60). Since
the dependent variable is completely random and is therefore neither censored nor one of its
categories has very few cases, nonconvergence is most likely due to small sample size (Long
1997, 59–60). This once again confirms the problematic application of ML estimators on
small N data.
It is important to highlight here that the experiment has been conducted using balanced
BTSCS data, while many BTSCS datasets – including the datasets used for this analysis –
comprises unbalanced BTSCS data. However, the BGLM is still applicable on unbalanced
data with even a very small number of observations per unit (1 or 2) as these data still
contain information that improve the estimation of coefficients and variance parameters
(Gelman and Hill 2006, 276).
In sum, the Monte Carlo experiment has confirmed that the BMLP BTSCS model
provides unbiased estimates and correct standard errors even for small samples where
10 < N/T ≤ 30, which makes it applicable for the analysis of the EU BTSCS data used
for the investigating the effect of public support and transparency on sanctioning SGP
violations.
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8 Analysis: The Effect of Public Sup-
port and Transparency on EDP Ini-
tiations
After the confirmation of the suitability of the BGLM to be applied for this investigation,
I will present the statistical analysis in this section. However, before discussing the results
of this investigation, I will present some descriptive statistics of the dependent and key
independent variables 1.
8.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 21 shows the number of EDPs (measured as transferred opinions on the existence of
an excessive deficit) since 2002 in the EU per country. In the sample of “fiscal sinners”, there
are only three countries that have never experienced an EDP, namely Denmark, Finland
and Hungary. This result is particularly surprising for Hungary since it is has already
violated the pact eight times, as shown in Figure 25. This once again indicates that many
violations remain unsanctioned by the Commission. All other countries experienced at
least one EDP. Malta is a clear exception in this respect since it already experienced three
EDPs. However, for Malta only a few of its six committed violations were sanctioned.
Overall, this figure illustrates that although the SGP has only been in force for a very
1All graphs in this section were created using the R–packages car, ggplot2 and scales
(Fox and Weisberg 2011; Wickham 2016; Wickham 2017). Table 9 to 21 in the Appendix
present summary statistics of all variables included in the dataset created for this analysis.
For simplicity, I will focus on the dependent and key independent variables in this section.
The tables were created with the R–packages dplyr and xtable (Dahl 2016); Wickham
et al. 2017).
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short time, the majority of EU–members got already sanctioned for violating it, which is
unsurprising given the increasing debt and deficit levels in the EU (see Figures 3 and 4 ).
Therefore, there variation across countries is not very strong for this variable.
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Figure 21: EDPs (Opinion) per Country
Figure 22 shows the number of EDPs using the alternative specification of the dependent
variable, the publishing of the Commission report per country and year. For this measure,
Italy is besides Malta the country experiencing the most EDP initiations. Furthermore,
Finland is no longer among the countries that experienced no EDP for this measure.
However, this graph also confirms that most EU countries have already experienced at
least one EDP.
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Figure 22: EDPs (Reports) per Country
Figure 23 illustrates the number of EDPs since 2002 per year 2. This figure is quite
different from the one before, since there is much more variation. One can see that the
vast majority of EDPs was initiated in 2009, followed by 2004. This is also true for the
alternative specification of the dependent variable plotted in Figure 24.
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Figure 23: EDPs (Opinion) per Year
2For a tabular overview of the number of EDPs per country, see Table 6 in the Appendix.
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Figure 24: EDPs (Reports) per Year
When comparing this result with the number of SGP violations per year shown in
Figure 26 reveals that 2009 was indeed the year were most SGP violations were committed.
However, many SGP violations also took place in the remaining years, while much fewer
EDPs were opened by the Commission.
Since many European states were hit by the global financial crisis in 2009, the obser-
vations in Figure 26 contradict hypothesis 1 because these economic turbulences did not
stop the Commission from initiating an EDP against several member states (Lane 2012,
55–56). Figure 23 and Figure 24 also demonstrate that the given sample of “fiscal sinners”
contains much more variation on the dependent variable over time than across countries,
which makes it even more important to model this variation by an additional year–specific
random intercept in the multi-level model.
80
05
10
AUT BEL BGR CYP CZE DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC HRV HUN IRL ITA LTU LVA MLT NLD POL PRT ROU SVK SVN
Country
S
G
P
 V
io
la
tio
ns
Figure 25: Number of SGP Violations per Country
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Figure 26: Number of SGP Violations per Year
In sum, as already illustrated in Table 1 , breaking the SGP does not necessarily seem
to lead to an opening of an EDP by the European Commission. Overall, the descrip-
tive statistics shown here confirm the suspicion that the Commission’s sanctions are not
exclusively based on the violation of the SGP’s fiscal rules.
The key argument of this investigation is that the Commission is driven by political
considerations such as public support and transparency about a country’s economic situ-
ation when sanctioning SGP violations. As can be seen in Figures 27 to 31, these factors
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Figure 27: Trust in European Commission per Country and over Time
vary considerably across countries and over time. First of all, the absolute support for
the Commission measured by the share of respondents who express trust in the European
Commission shown in Figure reffig:comtrust decreases in all countries for most of the years,
even though there is a sligh increase before 2015. Over time, Belgium is the country in
which most citizens trust the Commission, while the level of trust is – unsurprisingly – the
lowest in Greece. At the same time, Belgium experienced a lower number of EDPs (one
EDP while violating the SGP seven times) than Greece (two EDPs out of twelve viola-
tions), which matches with the argument that higher levels of support for the Commission
lead to more EDP openings. However, the difference in the number of EDPs is, admittedly,
not very large between these two high– vs. low–support countries.
Furthermore, the relative support for the Commission compared with national govern-
ments presented in Figure 28 shows a slight negative trend over time, which indicates that
support for the Commission and consequently the SGP seems to slightly diminish com-
pared with governmental overspending. The positive values on the y–axis indicate that
support for the Commission (and therefore the SGP) exceeds support for governmental
overspending for most countries in the dataset. However, overall there is no country in
which the support for the Commission is consistently much higher than support for the na-
tional government throughout the time period to be investigated. However, in Malta, the
country which experienced the most EDPs, support for the Commission consistently (but
diminishing) exceeds support for the national government. In this sense, Malta matches the
theoretical expectation that high trust results in more EDP initiations. By contrast, the
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Figure 28: Relative Public Support per Country and over Time
difference between support for the Commission and support for the national government is
not very large for Austrian voters. They even seem to support their national government
more than the Commission around 2009/2010. At the same time, out of Austria’s seven
SGP violations, only one was sanctioned. This pattern confirms the theoretical expectation
that lower (relative) support for the Commission makes the Commission more hesitant to
sanction SGP violations.
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Figure 29: Share of Respondents with a Positive Image of the EU per Country and over
Time
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Finally, as previously mentioned, it is possible that voters might not support the Com-
mission, but the EU and its rules including the SGP in general. Figure 29 shows that
despite a negative trend in the share of respondents who expressed having a positive image
of the EU, this share increased around 2013 to 2015. In Romania and Bulgaria, most
respondents have a very good impression of the EU, while Greece and the UK are among
the states with the lowest share of respondents who perceive the EU as positive.
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Figure 30: Real GDP of EU States per Country and over Time
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Figure 31: GDP Growth of EU States per Country and over Time
While there is much variance in all indicators measuring public support for the Commis-
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sion between countries and over years, Figure 30 shows much less variation in transparency
of a country’s economic situation measured by real GDP. The graph depicts a remarkably
stable economic situation for all EU member states despite the experiences of the recent
European Sovereign Debt crisis. Here, Germany exhibits by far the highest real GDP over
the years, while Malta maintains the lowest one. In addition, no country seems to expe-
rience sudden and large declines in real GDP. The absence of such unforeseen economic
downturns suggests that transparency for the Commission – at least according to the cri-
teria of the SGP – is given in most member states. This picture changes when considering
the development of the second transparency measure, GDP Growth, in the selected EU
member states over time, which is depicted in Figure 31. Here, we can see a strong decline
for all member states in the crisis year 2009, which is sharpest for Latvia and Lithuania.
As a result, while transparency about deliberate overspending is given when considering
real GDP, this picture is somewhat less clear when considering economic growth. This is
once more not in line with hypothesis 1 as most EDPs were initiated when several countries
experienced a recession.
Upon first glance, the descriptive statistics seem to not support hypothesis 1. The
presentation of the results of the statistical analysis in the following section will clarify
whether the postulated relation between public support, transparency and EDP initiations
holds.
8.2 Regression Results
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Dependent Variable
EDP – Opinion EDP – Report
Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
Model
6
Model
7
Model
8
Model
9
Model
10
Model
11
Model
12
Trust in
European
Commission
×
Real GDP
–0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
Relative
Public
Support×
Real GDP
–0.00
(0.00)
–0.01
(0.01)
Trust in
European
Commission
×
GDP
Growth
–0.01
(0.74)
0.43
(0.60)
Table 4: Overview Regression Results
86
Dependent Variable
EDP – Opinion EDP – Report
Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
Model
6
Model
7
Model
8
Model
9
Model
10
Model
11
Model
12
Relative
Public
Support×
GDP
Growth
–0.74
(0.58)
–0.86
(0.58)
Positive
Image
of the EU
×
Real GDP
0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
Positive
Image
of the EU
×
GDP
Growth
–0.46
(0.55)
–0.12
(0.47)
Trust in
European
Commission
18.17
(9.83)
11.29
(6.03)
14.58
(7.40)
8.05
(3.51)
Table 4: Overview Regression Results
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Dependent Variable
EDP – Opinion EDP – Report
Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
Model
6
Model
7
Model
8
Model
9
Model
10
Model
11
Model
12
Relative
Public
Support
–1.73
(3.19)
–2.25
(2.89)
–4.75
(4.45)
–6.46
(4.14)
Positive
Image
of the EU
7.28
(3.88)
8.63
(3.56)
5.17
(3.52)
6.01
(2.51)
Real
GDP
0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
GDP
Growth
–0.13
(0.37)
0.09
(0.14)
0.05
(0.25)
–0.37
(0.30)
0.05
(0.15)
–0.12
(0.22)
Powerful
Memberstate
–0.37
(2.19)
1.21
(1.43)
1.05
(1.24)
0.51
(1.03)
–0.35
(1.40)
0.45
(0.87)
0.34
(1.89)
0.25
(0.95)
1.89
(2.56)
–0.08
(1.31)
–0.18
(1.39)
–0.15
(0.83)
Non–
Compliance
0.37
(0.30)
0.35
(0.30)
0.28
(0.25)
0.34
(0.29)
0.29
(0.24)
0.24
(0.23)
0.06
(0.12)
0.01
(0.09)
0.13
(0.20)
0.05
(0.13)
0.05
(0.09)
–0.00
(0.08)
Eurozone
Member
–2.41
(1.42)
–1.41
(0.92)
–2.10
(1.32)
–1.37
(0.98)
–1.50
(0.86)
–1.83
(0.98)
–1.47
(1.02)
–1.22
(0.81)
–2.02
(1.50)
–1.52
(1.17)
–1.10
(0.81)
–1.07
(0.73)
Table 4: Overview Regression Results
88
Dependent Variable
EDP – Opinion EDP – Report
Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
Model
6
Model
7
Model
8
Model
9
Model
10
Model
11
Model
12
Election
0.19
(0.67)
0.41
(0.53)
0.34
(0.65)
0.43
(0.56)
0.29
(0.57)
0.51
(0.60)
–0.04
(0.51)
–0.01
(0.47)
0.11
(0.56)
0.11
(0.50)
0.07
(0.44)
0.12
(0.44)
Intercept
–13.47
(6.99)
–6.43
(4.79)
–10.08
(4.94)
–5.85
(4.50)
–7.10
(4.31)
–7.35
(3.95)
–7.65
(4.62)
–3.66
(2.43)
–1.53
(3.89)
1.01
(2.74)
–2.34
(2.56)
–1.95
(1.83)
σα
3.68
(4.07)
1.52
(1.71)
2.84
(3.70)
2.16
(2.49)
1.15
(1.42)
1.23
(1.46)
4.15
(4.02)
2.22
(2.00)
9.12
(10.57)
5.02
(5.08)
2.21
(2.22)
1.51
(1.45)
σγ
15.75
(17.87)
16.72
(18.33)
12.05
(15.70)
16.38
(17.73)
10.36
(14.44)
9.75
(13.57)
4.59
(5.68)
2.56
(3.20)
12.09
(14.99)
5.53
(6.20)
2.88
(3.57)
1.61
(1.85)
Table 4: Overview Regression Results
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Table 4 present the results (coefficient and standard deviation) of all regression models
including robustness checks. Column 1 and 2 include the coefficient estimates for the
interactions between the two public support indicators Trust in European Commission
and Relative Public Support and real GDP, respectively3.
3Due to the complexity of the BMLP BTSCS model, I ran all models with three chains
iterating 800,000 times with a burn–in of 400,000 and a thinning interval of 400, which
leaves 1,000 simulation draws saved for each chain (Gelman and Hill 2006, 418; Gelman
et al. 2013, 282–283; Shor et al. 2007, 173). Here, values close to 1 of the Gelman–Rubin
Rˆ provided by the coda––package confirmed chain convergence (Cowles and Carlin 1996,
884–885; Gelman et al. 2013, 284–285; Plummer et al. 2006; Shor et al. 2007, 173). Besides
checking for chain convergence, I follow Gelman and Hill (2006) and Gelman et al. (2013)
in conducting posterior predictive checking (Gelman and Hill 2006, 513–521; Gelman et al.
2013, 143–150). For this purpose, I simulated replicated datasets p(yrep|X, β = βs), the
so called posterior predictive distribution, for the s = 3, 000 simulated parameter draws
βs given the matrix of independent variables X (Gelman and Hill 2006, 513). From the
posterior predictive distribution, I generated two discrepancy variables T (yrep, β), mean
and standard deviation, and compare them with the mean and standard deviation of the
observed data T (y, β) (Gelman and Hill 2006, 513–521). Furthermore, I computed Bayesian
p–values defined as p = Pr(T (yrep, β) > T (y, β|y) that indicate which proportion of the
3,000 simulations for which the test quantity is more extreme than the actual data (Gelman
and Hill 2006, 514); Gelman et al. 2013, 146). Figures 73 to 96 show histograms of the mean
and standard deviation for T (yrep) for each model. The vertical red lines indicate the value
of the observed mean and standard deviation of y, respectively, which corresponds to mean
and standard deviation of the dependent variable EDP (Gelman and Hill 2006, 520–521).
All graphs indicate a fairly good match between the mean and standard deviation of the
replicated data of all three models and the actual mean and standard deviation of the
dependent variable (Gelman and Hill 2006, 520–521). Moreover, the value of the Bayesian
p–values (see Table 22 in the Appendix) indicate a close similarity between the replicated
and the actual data since their values are close to 0.5 for all models (Ntzoufras 2009, 342.
Finally, Table 23 in the Appendix reports the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) of
each model which indicates each model’s out–of–sample predictive error (Gelman and Hill
2006, 525). Generally, lower values of the DIC indicate a better model fit, whereby Model
6 is the best model for out–of–sample predictions as it has the lowest DIC (Gelman and
Hill 2006, 526).
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The coefficient sign is equal to zero for both the interaction Trust in European Commis-
sion × Real GDP and the interaction consisting of Relative Public Support and Real GDP,
which indicates that the mean of the posterior distribution obtained from the Bayesian
model is close to zero (Western and Jackman 1994, 418). Since the 2.5% and 97.5%
percentile of the posterior distribution equal –0.01 and 0.01 for the coefficients for both
interaction terms, there is a 95% probability that the parameter value lies between these
values (Martin 2008, 503; Western and Jackman 1994, 418).
However, it should be stressed that it is not possible to infer whether public support
and transparency have a meaningful effect on the initiation of an EDP from the magnitude
of the interaction terms’ coefficients (Brambor et al. 2006, 74). This is because the coef-
ficient of interaction terms in non–linear models is not equal to the marginal effect of the
interaction term (Ai and Norton 2003, 122–129; Brambor et al. 2006, 77)4. Moreover, as
the interaction effect for an interaction term consisting of two continuous variables x and
z can be described by the cross derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable
E[Y ] = Φ(β1x+ β2z + β3xz +Xβ) = Φ′′(·) (8.1)
,
∂2Φ(·)
∂x∂z
= β3Φ′(·) + (β1 + β3z)(β2 + β3x)Φ′′(·) (8.2)
,
which remains non–zero and equal to
∂2Φ(·)
∂x∂z
= β1β2Φ′′(·) (8.3)
,
4Note that it is also not possible to interpret the coefficients of the constituent terms of
the interaction terms included in all models as the average effect on the dependent variable
(Brambor et al. 2006, 71–72). This is because they only capture the effect of each public
support indicator on the opening of an EDP when real GDP is equal to zero (and vice
versa) (Brambor et al. 2006, 71–72). The only way to measure the average effect of the
constituent terms on the dependent variable is to run an unconditional model without an
interaction term that consists of these constituent terms (Brambor et al. 2006, 72). Since
only conditional hypotheses are of interest for this analysis, I did not conduct such an
additional analysis.
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even if the coefficient for the interaction term, β3, is equal to zero (Ai and Norton 2003,
124).
Since the table results convey little information for hypothesis testing, I follow Brambor
et al. (2006), Gelman and Hill (2007) and King et al. (2000) and present a graphical
illustration of the results (Brambor et al. 2006, 74; Gelman and Hill 2006, 94; King et al.
2000, 347–351). In line with King et al. (2000), I simulate expected values (see equation
8.1), which not only allows me to assess the average effect of each public support indicator
on EDP initiation for different levels of transparency, but also to determine the uncertainty
around this effect (King et al. 2000, 347–351). For frequentist models, this simulation
procedure usually involves drawing randomly M β parameters from a multivariate normal
distribution that takes the parameters’ point estimates and variance–covariance matrix as
mean and standard deviation (King et al. 2000, 349–350). For a Bayesian model like the
one used here, simulating expected values is much more convenient since it is possible to
directly gather the M parameter estimates from the posterior distribution, which already
comprisesM = 3, 000 simulation draws in total5. (Gelman and Hill 2006, 418; Gelman et al.
2013, 282–283; King et al. 2000, 349–352). These parameter draws, in turn, can vary in
their size, thereby reflecting the estimation uncertainty about their exact value which arises
from having only a finite number of observations at hand (King et al. 2000, 349). Besides
estimation uncertainty, there also exists fundamental uncertainty, which stems from the
fact that there might be always a factor not considered in the set of independent variables
of the model that affects the outcome variable (King et al. 2000, 349). The large number
of simulations (M = 3, 000) ensures that the expected values average over fundamental
uncertainty, while estimation uncertainty remains left (King et al. 2000, 350–351).
Besides the random parameter draws, it is also necessary to choose meaningful values
for each explanatory variable included in the model for the calculation of the expected
values (King et al. 2000, 351). For this purpose, I set up two “scenarios”, where each
public support measure ranges from minimum to maximum, while the conditioning variable
transparency is set equal to either its maximum (indicating high transparency for the
Commission) or its minimum (indicating low transparency for the Commission). For the
control variables, I fixed the value for the count control variable Non–Compliance equal
to its mean, while the remaining binary control variables were held constant at value 1
5This number stems from running each model with three Markov Chains of 1,000 iter-
ations, respectively (Gelman and Hill 2006, 418; Gelman et al. 2013, 282–283; King et al.
2000, 349–352).
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(King et al. 2000, 355). Consequently, the quantity of interest to be simulated here is the
probability of an EDP initiation if public support changes from minimum to maximum
and transparency is high, given a powerful Eurozone memberstate with a mean level of
non–compliance and an election taking place. Finally, the expected values of this quantity
are obtained via multiplying the coefficient draws with the predefined covariate values and
plugging them into a standard normal cumulative distribution link function, which is the
systematic component of the probit model (King et al. 2000, 348–355; Wooldridge 2002,
457–458; Wooldridge 2009, 575–576). The expected values for the two scenarios for the
first model in which absolute public support is measured by the amount of trust in the
Commission and transparency by real GDP are shown in Figure 32 and 33, respectively.
The solid line in Figure 32 shows the probability of opening of an EDP for high levels
of transparency (namely, high levels of real GDP) when trust in the European Commission
ranges from minimum to maximum. As one can see, higher values of public support seem
to have a meaningful effect on the probability of EDP openings if transparency is high.
However, the vertical lines in the graph show the estimation uncertainty of these ex-
pected values (King et al. 2000, 355). The probability of an EDP initiation ranges from
0 to 1 for all values of the variable Trust in European Commission and high levels of
transparency (King et al. 2000, 355). This result implies that the launch of an EDP by
the European Commission is very uncertain even if both transparency and public support
are high. The reason for this high estimation uncertainty stems from the low number of
observations (N = 406) used for this investigation (King et al. 2000, 355).
Note that the small N problem persists also in a Bayesian model: for a large N that
moves towards infinity, the posterior collapses on a spike over the true parameter value
because the information in the data overwhelm the prior (Jackman 2009, 30–31). The
combination of uninformative priors for the coefficients of the independent variables which
state a diffuse effect of these variables on EDP and a small dataset leaves a larger variance
of each parameter’s spike because the information in the data are not sufficient to overrun
the uncertainty induced by the prior (Jackman 2009, 16). This is reflected as estimation
uncertainty in the model.
Figure 33 illustrates the counter scenario, namely the expected probability of opening an
EDP if transparency is low (that is, low levels of real GDP) while the values of the public
support–indicator increase. Interestingly, the horizontal line in this graph implies that
public support for the Commission seems to still have a positive effect on EDP initiations,
even if transparency is low. This supports the first theoretical argument that public support
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is crucial for NMI sanctioning, but contradicts the second theoretical argument that this
effect would depend on the level of transparency. Moreover, from the vertical lines one can
see that the estimation uncertainty of an EDP initiation is in this graph much higher for
high levels of trust in the European Commission compared with lower levels of trust.
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Figure 32: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Trust in European
Commission and Real GDP on EDP (Opinion) Initiation (Real GDP = high)
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Figure 33: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Trust in European
Commission and Real GDP on EDP (Opinion) Initiation (Real GDP = low)
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The results of the first model indicate that higher values of absolute support for the
Commission increase the probability of an EDP initiation regardless the level of trans-
parency, albeit with a high estimation uncertainty. Figure 34 shows the effect of relative
amount of public support for the Commission – measured by the differential between the
variables Trust in European Commission and Trust in National Government – on EDP
initiations given high transparency. From this graph, we can also observe that if trust
in the Commission exceeds the level of trust for the national government, the probabil-
ity for an EDP initiation slightly increases given a high level of transparency. Moreover,
Figure 34 seems to support Köhler et al.’s (2018) predictions that only if voters’ support
for compliance with the SGP is higher than their support for governmental overspending,
the Commission is more willing to sanction violations of the SGP because its enforcement
costs are low in this case. Nevertheless, here, the probability of an EDP initiation ranges
between 0 and 1 for most values of the variable Relative Public Support given that trans-
parency is high, thereby indicating high estimation uncertainty of the results due to the
small dataset.
As for the first Model, Figure 35 depicts how the effect of Relative Public Support affects
EDP initiations if transparency is low, while the uncertainty of an EDP initiation is lowest
for low levels of Relative Public Support. Somewhat counter–intuitively, an increase in the
second public support indicator seems to reduce the probability of an EDP initiation if no
sufficient level of transparency is given, and the uncertainty of the probability of sanctioning
also decreases here. In contrast to the first model, the effect of Relative Public Support is
clearly dependent on the amount of transparency, given that the effect of public support on
EDP initiations completely changes for low levels of transparency. The conclusion drawn
from this model is therefore that even if voters support the Commission and the SGP more
than governmental overspending, the Commission will refrain from opening an EDP as it
cannot be certain that violating the SGP’s rules was committed deliberately. The results
of this model indicate that the positive effect of rising levels of public support depends on
high levels of transparency. Unfortunately, the data still do not provide a sufficient amount
of information to reduce estimation uncertainty of this result.
Regarding the BTSCS specification, one can see from Table 4 that the variability among
years is larger than the variability among countries in both models (Gelman and Hill 2006,
458). This is further confirmed by the caterpillar plots6 of the country–level random effects
6All caterpillar plots in this section and the appendix have been created with the
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Figure 34: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction between Relative Public Sup-
port and Real GDP on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (Real GDP = high)
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Figure 35: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Relative Public Sup-
port and Real GDP on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (Real GDP = low)
αi and the year–level random effects γt (see Figures 36 and 37) of each model including
95% credible intervals of the estimates, respectively (Fahrmeir et al. 2013, 376–377). While
we observe heterogeneity for both country– and year–level random –effects, it is larger for
the year–level random–effects (Fahrmeir et al. 2013, 376–407). This is less surprising
given that the sample exclusively consists of developed EU member states with a relatively
R–package mcmcplots (Curtis 2015).
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similar level of economic performance, as shown in Figure 30. Nevertheless, observing this
variability for both kinds of random effects illustrates the presence of heterogeneity at not
only the country–, but also the year–level in BTSCS data and consequently the importance
of modeling it (Fahrmeir et al. 2013, 402). Thus, the regression results confirm the need for
considering year–level random intercepts when applying multi-level models on (B)TSCS
data.
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Figure 36: Random Effects of Model 1 (Trust in European Commission × Real GDP).
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Figure 37: Random Effects of Model 2 (Relative Public Support × Real GDP).
The results of the first and the second model, where the two public support indicators
Trust in European Commission and Relative Public Support have been interacted with
Real GDP, seemed too uncertain to confirm hypothesis 1 stating that the probability of
EDP initiations increases if public support and transparency are high. However, are these
results also robust? Figures 43 to 587 (see Appendix) show the results of the robustness
7Colums 3 and 4 in Table 4 include the coefficient estimates of all robustness check
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checks where Trust in European Commission and Relative Public Support have been inter-
acted with the second transparency measure GDP Growth. Furthermore, the third public
support indicator, Positive Image of the EU, has been interacted with both Real GDP and
GDP Growth, respectively, and six additional models have been run with the alternative
specification of the dependent variable.
For the interaction between Trust in European Commission and GDP Growth (Figures
43 and 44) we can see that the results of the first model still hold: for high levels of
support for the Commission and high GDP growth, there is an increase in the probability
of an EDP initiation, while the estimation uncertainty of an EDP initiation increases with
higher values of trust. However, as for Model 1, the effect of public support does not
seem to depend on transparency as higher levels of trust still lead to a higher probability
of sanctioning even if transparency is low. For this scenario, the probability of an EDP
initiation ranges from 0 to 1 for all values of Trust in European Commission, whereby
estimation uncertainty is still very high.
Figures 45 and 46 illustrate the effect of the Relative Public Support variable on EDP
initiations conditional on transparency measured by GDP growth. From the two plots, it
becomes obvious that the results of Model 2 are not robust: when interacted with GDP
Growth, higher support for the Commission yields a lower probability of EDP initiation
when GDP Growth is fixed at its maximum, while it increases the probability of an EDP
opening if GDP Growth is low. The expected probability ranges between 0 and 0.4 for high
values of Relative Public Support and a maximum of GDP Growth, while the uncertainty
of an EDP initiation also remains very high for all values of Relative Public Support if GDP
Growth is set to its minimum.
Models 5 and 6 (for coefficient estimates, see Column 5 and 6 in Table 4) consider
the fact that it is possible that citizens are skeptical about the Commission itself due to
its weak legitimization, but supportive of the EU and its rules in general. Here, public
support is measured by the share of respondents expressing having a positive image of the
EU and is interacted with Real GDP and GDP Growth, respectively. Figures 47 and 48
picture the effect of the variable Positive Image of the EU on EDP openings conditional
on the level of transparency measured by real GDP (high/low). We can see that the higher
the share of respondents in a country that express having a positive image of the EU, the
more likely it becomes that the Commission will open an EDP against a given country
models. However, since the coefficients are not interpretable, in the robustness checks I
will also exclusively focus on the expected values for interpretation and hypothesis testing.
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that violated the SGP’s rules given that transparency is high. Even if transparency is low,
on the other hand, we still see a positive effect of the share of respondents who perceive
the EU as positive on the probability of EDP openings, as illustrated by Figure 48 . Once
again, the effect of public support seems to be independent of the levels of transparency.
However, in both scenarios, the estimation uncertainty of an EDP initiation increases with
higher shares of respondents who have a positive impression of the EU.
The same is true for the model where Positive Image of the EU has been interacted
with GDP Growth, as shown in Figures 49 and 50: high values of public support and
transparency make sanctioning of SGP violations more likely, while the uncertainty of an
EDP initiation increases with a higher share of respondents with a positive opinion about
the EU. The positive effect of public support on the probability of EDP openings is still
given even without high transparency, but the probability of an EDP initiation ranges
between 0 and 1 for all values of the last public support indicator.
For the robustness check with the alternative specification of the dependent variable,
six additional models covering all interactions between each public support measure and
transparency measure have been run (see Columns 7 to 12, Table 4). Figures 51 to 62
show the results for this additional robustness check. The results of the model including
the interaction term Trust in Commission × Real GDP with Real GDP contradicts the
predictions of hypothesis 1 as there is no longer a positive effect of high values in Trust in
Commission on EDP initiations if transparency is high; rather, we see no effect of public
support and the uncertainty of an EDP initiation ranges from 0 to 1 for all values of
Trust in Commission. Somewhat counter-intuitively, high values of Trust in Commission
increase the probability of an EDP initiation if Real GDP equals its minimum, as Figure
52 shows. Nevertheless, the estimation of an EDP initiation remains still very high for
high values of public support, as it ranges from 0.1 to 1.
By contrast, the results of the model where Trust in Commission is interacted with
GDP Growth – which are shown in Figures 53 and 54 – once again show that high values of
public support and transparency increase the probability of an EDP initiation, albeit with
major estimation uncertainty. If GDP Growth is low, this positive effect of public support is
no longer present, which is different from the model using the first EDP operationalization
and highlights the importance of transparency. Nevertheless, the estimation uncertainty
of an EDP initiation is also very high for this scenario throughout all values of the public
support indicator.
Similar to the first model, the positive effect of high values of Relative Public Support on
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EDP initiations conditional on high levels of transparency – measured by Real GDP – is not
robust when using a different specification of EDP initiations, as Figures 55 and 56 show.
Here, more support for the Commission in contrast to the national government reduces
the probability of an EDP initiation given high transparency, albeit with high estimation
uncertainty. The same is true for low values of Real GDP and for the interaction of Relative
Public Support and GDP Growth when GDP Growth is set to its maximum (see Figure
57). In this case, the probability of an EDP initiation is ranging between 0 and 0.2 if
Relative Public Support is high. For low values of transparency measured by GDP Growth
(see Figure 58), a higher support for the Commission than for the national government
surprisingly increases the probability of an EDP initiation, but this probability again ranges
between 0 and 1. Transparency thus seems to have an effect here, but not in the expected
way.
For the models where the last measure of public support, Positive Image of the EU, is
interacted with each measure of transparency, the results remain robust when a different
dependent variable is chosen and in line with hypothesis 1, which is depicted in Figure 59 to
62. Here, the level of transparency again seems to matter less than the level of transparency
for the initiation of an EDP, as we observe an increasing probability of sanctioning with
rising values of the variable Positive Image of the EU, regardless the level of any measure
of transparency, although the probability of an EDP initiation also remains very uncertain
for this model specification.
Table 5 provides an overview of the results with respect to the effect of public support
on EDP initiations on for all model specifications.
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Table 5: Overview Results (including Robustness Checks)
Model Interaction Dependent
Variable
Effect
1 Trust in Commission × Real GDP EDP – Opinion) +
2 Relative Public Support × Real GDP EDP – Opinion) +
3 Trust in Commission × GDP Growth EDP – Opinion) +
4 Relative Public Support × GDP Growth EDP – Opinion) –
5 Positive Image of the EU × Real GDP EDP – Opinion) +
6 Positive Image of the EU × GDP Growth EDP – Opinion) +
7 Trust in Commission × Real GDP EDP – Report –
8. Trust in Commission × GDP Growth EDP – Report +
9 Relative Public Support × Real GDP EDP – Report –
10 Relative Public Support × GDP Growth EDP – Report –
11 Positive Image of the EU × Real GDP EDP – Report +
12 Positive Image of the EU × GDP Growth EDP – Report +
Finally, Figures 63 to Figure 72 show the caterpillar plots of the country– and year–random
effects for all robustness check models. From the caterpillar plots and the estimates of σα
and σγ in the regression tables, we can see that heterogeneity at the year–level is also much
larger than heterogeneity at the country level for the robustness check models.
In sum, the results of both the analysis and the robustness checks indicate a positive
effect of public support on the probability of EDP initiations as postulated in hypothesis
1 for most models. However, transparency seems to be a less crucial determinant than
public support as an increase of this factor made sanctioning SGP violations more likely
regardless the level of transparency. Furthermore, the uncertainty of expected probabil-
ities is very high due to few observations in the dataset, which stems from the fact that
this investigation focuses exclusively on the EU – which only comprises 28 member states
– and the SGP has only been in force since 2002. This data does not provide sufficient
information to overrule the uninformative prior. Finally, the results were not robust for
the indicators Trust in European Commission and Real GDP for the different specifica-
tion of the dependent variable. They were also not robust for Relative Public Support –
which considered public support for the national government (and implicitly governmental
overspending) besides support for the European Commission – when interacted with GDP
Growth instead of Real GDP as a measure of transparency and also for the alternative
dependent variable. Hypothesis 1 can therefore be rejected due to high uncertainty of all
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results and a lack of robustness.
Nevertheless, the results of the analysis support the impression that sanctioning be-
havior of the Commission is influenced by legitimacy concerns. From a methodological
perspective, the results stress the importance of modeling year–level effects in BTSCS
data due to high heterogeneity at the year level, which exceeded variation at the coun-
try–level. This is particularly true for samples of homogeneous, developed countries like
EU or OECD member states.
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9 Summary and Discussion
In the preceding chapters, a new theoretical argument based on combining insights from
both EU research and Judicial Politics has been developed to explain the ineffectiveness of
the European Commission’s sanctioning of SGP violations. I have identified the levels of
public support and transparency as crucial determinants for the Commission’s sanctioning
behavior. By doing so, I expand the literature on SGP (in)effectiveness by highlighting
the Commission’s legitimacy and transparency problem at the member state level which
reduces the effectiveness of non–majoritarian fiscal surveillance in the EU. Unfortunately,
the empirical test of this argument provides insufficient evidence that high levels of public
support and transparency make it more likely that the Commission will sanction SGP
violations by initiating an EDP, which is mainly due to the small dataset. This indicates
the need for future research to re–test the theoretical argument on a larger dataset to see
whether this results change in favor for hypothesis 1.
Nevertheless, most expected values hint at an effect of high levels of public support on
EDP initiations. Therefore, this study provides some evidence that the Commission is a
strategic actor that only enters conflicts with member state governments if its prospects
for success are promising, and that this is not only true for infringement procedures (see,
for example, König and Mäder 2014; Fjelstul and Carrubba 2018), but also for EDP
procedures.
Given that the dataset used to test the theoretical argument is a smallN BTSCS dataset
on EU member states for a limited period of time, I propose a Bayesian Multi-level Probit
Model with a country– and year–level random intercept (BMLP BTSCS) to model panel
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. I have provided a test for this model’s
performance in capturing these BTSCS characteristics to the one of existing techniques in
a Monte Carlo experiment. Since the results of the experiment confirmed that the BMLP
BTSCS model appropriately accounts for panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous
correlation, this dissertation also contributes to the methodological literature by providing
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a broad comparison of BTSCS models and identifying Bayesian multi-level models as an
appropriate alternative for analyzing small N BTSCS data.
The findings of this dissertation project hold implications for several areas of political
science research and real–world politics.
First, the empirical findings offer a hint that a lack of legitimacy of the Commission
hampers the effectiveness of the SGP links the economic performance of the EU back to
the discussion of the EU’s "democratic deficit” (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Majone 1998;
Moravcsik 2002). In particular, the findings of this project question Majone’s (1998) claim
that “economic integration without political integration is possible only if politics and
economics are kept as separate as possible” in two ways (Majone 1998, 5). First, this
investigation offered a first insight that it is very difficult to completely separate politics
from economics since even NMIs – which are seemingly “unpolitical” – need to be concerned
about their legitimacy and hence political power towards elected governments that they are
supposed to sanction in case of non–compliance. Second, it might be the ineffectiveness
caused by the attempt to separate economics and politics that is likely to slow down
economic integration in the future: this is because events like the European sovereign debt
crisis, which at least partly stemmed from the ineffectiveness of the SGP, led to increased
Euroscepticism and opposition towards further (economic) integration, which has been
confirmed by several studies (Braun and Tausendpfund 2014; Clements et al. 2014; Hobolt
and Tilley 2016; Kuhn and Stöckel 2014). Moreover, the findings raise the concern of
whether the Commission’s consideration of public support for their sanctioning decisions
could incentivize member state governments to spread Euroscepticism among their voters
to continue overspending without any negative consequences.
Second, this study has shown that public support and transparency are not only decisive
for the behavior of constitutional courts, but might play a role for other institutions that
can, as the court, be classified as NMIs. Besides the European Commission, this includes
institutions like independent central banks, regulatory authorities or even International
Organizations (Majone 2001, 58). Since the results suggest that public support could
influence the behavior of any these NMIs, this raises the question of whether NMIs might
suffer from their own kind of “time–inconsistency problem”, namely that their behavior is
not determined by elections, but varying levels of public support (Majone 2001, 62)1.
1According to Majone (2001), the term “time–inconsistency problem” refers to the situ-
ation where “[...] a government’s optimal long–run policy differs from its optimal short–run
policy [...]”, which often incentivizes the government to deviate from its long–term commit-
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Third, methodologically, the higher amount of heterogeneity among years than among
countries in the data used here stressed the importance of modeling not only country–,
but also year–level random effects when using Multi-level models on (B)TSCS data. This
is particularly true for research on the EU or the OECD, where the samples comprise very
similar countries that are closely linked to each other politically and economically. This
structure makes it likely that there is both contemporaneous correlation and more variance
between years than across countries present.
Fourth, in terms of implications for EU politics, governments and EU officials need to
particularly address the problem of lacking legitimacy of the Commission to improve the
functioning of the SGP and consequently to prevent high debts and deficits in the future.
A possible solution would be the establishment of competitive European Parliamentary
Elections, with the result of a supranational European government that is accountable to
the parliament and hence to the voters (Hix and Høyland 2011, 132–137). Such an insti-
tution would possess the necessary amount of legitimacy and political power to sanction
any member state government that violates the SGP’s reference values, thereby ensuring
the proper function of the Eurozone in particular and the EU in general. Admittedly, this
is unfortunately unlikely to happen in the near future due to the above mentioned rising
Euroscepticism caused by the European sovereign debt crisis.
Finally, there naturally several possibilities exist to improve and extend the analysis.
First and foremost, the dataset used for this analysis is rather small as it comprises less
than 30 countries and less than 20 years, which contributed of to excessive estimation
uncertainty of the results (King et al. 2000, 355). Re–running the analysis with a sample
that covers a longer period of time, ideally with more variance on the dependent variable,
would make the current results more reliable. It would also be possible to split–up the
sample into countries that violated the deficit rule and countries that violated the debt
rule to ascertain whether the Commission’s behavior differs with the SGP rule that has
been violated, particularly since the deficit criterion has been considered as more important
in the past (Bauer and Becker 2014, 220–227). Methodologically, it would be possible to
account for serial correlation in the individual error terms to further avoid overconfidence
ments Majone 2001, 62). The time–inconsistency problem is most prominent in monetary
policy, where governments are assumed to have an inflationary bias to stimulate the econ-
omy before an election, which can lead to unexpected inflation (Eijffinger and De Haan
1996, 5–7). As a solution to this problem, monetary policy is delegated to an independent
central bank (Eijffinger and De Haan 1996, 5–7).
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in the regression results, as suggested by Pang (2010) (Pang 2010, 470–475). In order to
test this model’s performance, a more extensive Monte Carlo experiment, probably even
with varying levels of panel heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation and serial
correlation, could be conducted (Shor et al. 2007, 173). Furthermore, if the researcher
suspects a country– (or year) –varying effect of some independent variables, the model
could also be extended by adding a random–slope coefficient (Beck and Katz 2007, 183–184;
Gelman and Hill 2006, 237–238; Shor et al. 2007, 176).
I have chosen to use non–informative priors for this analysis. However, Bayesian mod-
els generally allow for including additional information available in the analysis by using
informative priors (Gelman and Hill 2006, 392–393). If researchers have clearer expecta-
tions about the effect of some variables on EDP initiations in the future, including these
information in the regression model via informative priors for the β–coefficients may lead
to further improvements of the results. Another possibility would be the application of a
mixed–methods design that would allow the researcher to gain a more in–depth understand-
ing of the Commission’s sanctioning behavior by combining quantitative with qualitative
methods such as case studies (Bäck and Dumont 2007, 469; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009).
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10 Concluding Remarks
This study has focused on the political reasons for the Commission’s hesitant sanctioning
behavior of SGP violations in particular and the ineffectiveness of supranational non–majoritarian
economic governance in general. Theoretically, it combines arguments from EU research
and judicial politics on the strategic nature of NMI decision–making and expands the lit-
erature on SGP research by the argument that the lack of legitimacy and transparency
explain the European Commission’s ineffective sanctioning of SGP violations. Empirically,
it adds to this literature by providing the first quantitative analysis that tests the impact
of public support and transparency on EDP initiations by the Commission.
In terms of methodology, the dataset used for the quantitative analysis conducted here
comprised data for 25 EU states for 2002 to 2017, which classifies them as BTSCS data.
Analyzing such data is methodologically challenging, as they comprise information on a
few countries for a limited time period that are both politically and economically highly
intertwined with each other. This requires to simultaneously account for small sample size,
contemporaneous correlation and panel heteroskedasticity and raises the question on which
method is most suitable to address all these characteristics. For this purpose, a BMLP
BTSCS model with a country– and year–specific random intercept has been introduced and
tested compared with the performance of existing methods for BTSCS data analysis in a
Monte Carlo experiment. The results of the experiments showed that the BMLP BTSCS
model yields unbiased estimates and correct standard errors for small sample sizes. This
dissertation therefore also contributes to the methodological literature on BTSCS data
analysis by identifying a suitable alternative to existing BTSCS modeling techniques.
The results of the investigation about the determinants of EDP openings by the Eu-
ropean Commission once again suggest that there is the need for further investigation of
whether the Commission’s (sanctioning) behavior might be driven by strategic consider-
ations (König and Mäder 2014; Köhler et al. 2018). It has been demonstrated that the
Commission is more likely to initiate an EDP if public support and transparency about a
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country’s economic situation are sufficiently high, but the results are not robust if support
for the national government is considered and estimation uncertainty is high due to the
small dataset. Nevertheless, an important implication of this finding is that the Commis-
sion’s legitimacy and transparency problem inherent in the its institutional design might be
able to eliminate the SGP’s sanctioning mechanism as they could induce the Commission
to only act if it considers both problems to be solved.
There are a number in which this investigation could be improved. As previously men-
tioned, this analysis’ dataset is rather small due to limited data availability. Furthermore,
there is very little variation on the dependent variable across countries as most EU member
states have been at least once experienced an EDP and since 2013, the Commission has not
opened a EDP against any country. These drawbacks of the current data make it necessary
to re–run the analysis in the future with a dataset that comprises both more observations
and variance. Another aspect is that violating the debt criterion has in the past been
considered as less crucial for sanctioning than a violation of the deficit reference value. In
order to ascertain whether the Commission’s sanctioning behavior differs for the violation
of either SGP rule, one could run the analysis on two different samples of countries where
the first group violated the debt rule and the second one the deficit rule only.
Besides accounting for panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation, the
BMLP model introduced in this study could be extended by considering serial correlation
in the individual–level errors. The modification of the current method would then require
a more extensive Monte Carlo experiment where the degree of panel heteroskedasticity,
contemporaneous correlation and serial correlation is allowed to vary. The inclusion of
a random–slope would further allow the researcher to detect country– or year–varying
effects of some independent variables. Moreover, adding information about the effect of
some variables on EDP initiations that might be available in the future via the use of
informative priors may also yield more precise results.
The focus of this dissertation has clearly been on the use of quantitative methods.
Applying a mixed–methods design where quantitative methods are combined with quali-
tative methods like case studies would allow for deeper insights of the underlying causal
mechanism that explains the Commission’s sanctioning decisions.
As a concluding remark, the findings of this study suggest that the “democratic deficit”
of the Commission that stems from its lack of legitimacy and that might contribute to the
ineffectiveness of the SGP requires further investigation. In particular, previous claims on
the separability of political and economic integration need to be reevaluated. For the future
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of the EMU, it is crucial that particularly voters – rather than governments or EU elites
– understand this relationship, given that their interests are the driving force of successful
EU integration.
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11 Appendix
11.1 Monte Carlo Experiment
11.1.1 Variance-Covariance Matrix of Errors for BTSCS Data
According to Wallace and Hussain (1969), the variance-covariance matrix ∑ is defined as
∑
= σ2ωINT + σ2αiD + σ
2
γB (11.1)
Beck and Katz 1995, 636; Carsey and Harden 2013, 107-108; Shor et al. 2007, 172-173;
Singer and Willett 2003, 249-250; Wallace and Hussain 1969, 56-58.
INT is an NT ×NT identity matrix denoted as
INT =

1 0 0 . . . 0
0 1 0 . . . 0
0 0 1 . . . 0
... ... ... . . . 0
0 0 0 0 1

;
D being a NT ×NT block diagonal matrix given by
D =

JT 0 0 . . . 0
0 JT 0 . . . 0
0 0 JT . . . 0
... ... ... . . . 0
0 0 0 0 JT

;
where JT is a T × T matrix of ones;
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JT =

1 1 1 . . . 1
1 1 1 . . . 1
1 1 . . . 1
... ... ... . . . 1
1 1 1 1 1

;
and B being a NT ×NT block matrix equal to
B =

IT IT IT . . . IT
IT IT IT . . . IT
IT IT IT . . . IT
... ... ... . . . IT
IT IT IT IT IT

;
where IT is a T × T identity matrix
IT =

1 0 0 . . . 0
0 1 0 . . . 0
0 0 1 . . . 0
... ... ... . . . 0
0 0 0 0 1

Wallace and Hussain 1969, 56-58. For D and B, there are N rows and columns of the
block matrices JT and IT , respectively Beck and Katz 1995, 636; Carsey and Harden 2013,
107-108; Shor et al. 2007, 172-173; Singer and Willett 2003, 249-250; Wallace and Hussain
1969, 56-58.
For N = 3 (= three countries) and T = 3 (= three years), the covariance matrix ∑ can be
calculated as follows:
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∑
= σ2ω

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

+ σ2αi

1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1

+ σ2γ

1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1

∑
=

σ2ω 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 σ2ω 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 σ2ω 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2ω 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 σ2ω 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 σ2ω 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 σ2ω 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 σ2ω 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 σ2ω

+

σ2αi σ
2
αi
σ2αi 0 0 0 0 0 0
σ2αi σ
2
αi
σ2αi 0 0 0 0 0 0
σ2αi σ
2
αi
σ2αi 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2αi σ
2
αi
σ2αi 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2αi σ
2
αi
σ2αi 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2αi σ
2
αi
σ2αi 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 σ2αi σ
2
αi
σ2αi
0 0 0 0 0 0 σ2αi σ
2
αi
σ2αi
0 0 0 0 0 0 σ2αi σ
2
αi
σ2αi

+

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11.1.2 Monte Carlo Experiment Results: Tables
Table 6: Monte Carlo Experiment: Absolute Bias
N T Probit B & K Freq. MLP Freq. MLP BTSCS BMLP BMLP BTSCS
10 10 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.29
10 20 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.12 0.10
10 30 0.17 0.15 0.26 0.25 0.06 0.03
10 40 0.18 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.10 0.06
10 50 0.17 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.09 0.08
20 10 0.20 0.19 0.27 0.27 0.11 0.10
20 20 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.27 0.17 0.14
20 30 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.12 0.09
20 40 0.17 0.17 0.27 0.26 0.11 0.09
20 50 0.16 0.15 0.27 0.26 0.10 0.08
30 10 0.17 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.07 0.04
30 20 0.17 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.08
30 30 0.19 0.18 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.10
30 40 0.15 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.07
30 50 0.16 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.09 0.06
40 10 0.19 0.17 0.27 0.26 0.12 0.09
40 20 0.15 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.10 0.07
40 30 0.15 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.10 0.08
40 40 0.16 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.09 0.06
40 50 0.19 0.18 0.27 0.26 0.12 0.10
50 10 0.14 0.13 0.26 0.26 0.09 0.05
50 20 0.16 0.15 0.27 0.26 0.12 0.10
50 30 0.17 0.17 0.27 0.26 0.11 0.09
50 40 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.27 0.13 0.11
50 50 0.17 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.11 0.08
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Table 7: Monte Carlo Experiment: Mean Squared Error
N T Probit B & K Freq. MLP Freq. MLP BTSCS BMLP BMLP BTSCS
10 10 0.79 1.05 0.12 0.16 1.41 2.86
10 20 0.38 0.51 0.09 0.09 0.59 0.86
10 30 0.21 0.28 0.08 0.07 0.29 0.35
10 40 0.19 0.24 0.08 0.08 0.25 0.30
10 50 0.16 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.24
20 10 0.37 0.43 0.09 0.09 0.53 0.71
20 20 0.19 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.25 0.30
20 30 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.19
20 40 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.13
20 50 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.11
30 10 0.23 0.26 0.08 0.08 0.37 0.46
30 20 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.19
30 30 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.13
30 40 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
30 50 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
40 10 0.17 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.27 0.32
40 20 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.15
40 30 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09
40 40 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
40 50 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
50 10 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.21 0.25
50 20 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10
50 30 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
50 40 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
50 50 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04
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Table 8: Monte Carlo Experiment: Standard Errors
N T Probit B & K Freq. MLP Freq. MLP BTSCS BMLP BMLP BTSCS
10 10 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.39
10 20 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.14
10 30 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
10 40 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03
10 50 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03
20 10 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06
20 20 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
20 30 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
20 40 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
20 50 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00
30 10 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06
30 20 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
30 30 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
30 40 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
30 50 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
40 10 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
40 20 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
40 30 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
40 40 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
40 50 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
50 10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
50 20 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01
50 30 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
50 40 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
50 50 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02
116
11.1.3 Monte Carlo Experiment Results: Graphs
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(a) N = 10 and T = 10
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(b) N = 10 and T = 20
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(c) N = 10 and T = 30
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 10 and T = 40
(d) N = 10 and T = 40
l
l
l
l
l
l
x1
−2 0 2
Coefficient
Va
ria
bl
e
Model
l
l
l
l
l
l
B & K
BMLP
BMLP BTSCS
Freq. MLP
Freq. MLP BTSCS
Probit
True parameter value (= 0.3)
Monte Carlo Results for N = 10 and T = 50
(e) N = 10 and T = 50
Figure 38: Coefficient Estimates and 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals for N = 10 and
T Ranging from 10 to 50.
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 20 and T = 10
(a) N = 20 and T = 10
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(b) N = 20 and T = 30
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 20 and T = 40
(c) N = 20 and T = 40
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 20 and T = 50
(d) N = 20 and T = 50
Figure 39: Coefficient Estimates and 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals for N = 20 and
T Ranging from 10 to 50 (Except for N = 20 and T = 20).
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 30 and T = 10
(a) N = 30 and T = 10
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 30 and T = 40
(b) N = 30 and T = 40
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 30 and T = 50
(c) N = 30 and T = 50
Figure 40: Coefficient Estimates and 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals for N = 30 and
T Ranging from 10 to 50 (Except for N = 30 and T = 20/30).
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 40 and T = 10
(a) N = 40 and T = 10
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(b) N = 40 and T = 20
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 40 and T = 30
(c) N = 40 and T = 30
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 40 and T = 40
(d) N = 40 and T = 40
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Monte Carlo Results for N = 40 and T = 50
(e) N = 40 and T = 50
Figure 41: Coefficient Estimates and 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals for N = 40 and
T Ranging from 10 to 50.
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(a) N = 50 and T = 10
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(b) N = 50 and T = 20
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(c) N = 50 and T = 30
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(d) N = 50 and T = 40
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Figure 42: Coefficient Estimates and 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals for N = 50 and
T Ranging from 10 to 50.
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11.2 Descriptive Statistics - Tables
Table 9: Number of SGP Violations per Country
Country Number of SGP Violations
1 Austria 7
2 Belgium 7
3 Bulgaria 2
4 Croatia 2
5 Cyprus 6
6 Czech Republic 2
7 Denmark 1
8 Finland 2
9 France 14
10 Germany 8
11 Greece 12
12 Hungary 8
13 Ireland 5
14 Italy 12
15 Latvia 2
16 Lithuania 3
17 Malta 6
18 Netherlands 5
19 Poland 3
20 Portugal 12
21 Romania 2
22 Slovakia 2
23 Slovenia 5
24 Spain 7
25 United Kingdom 9
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Table 10: Number of SGP Violations per Year
Year Number of SGP Violations
1 2002 3
2 2003 6
3 2004 8
4 2005 7
5 2006 4
6 2007 2
7 2008 16
8 2009 21
9 2010 12
10 2011 14
11 2012 13
12 2013 13
13 2014 14
14 2015 6
15 2016 4
16 2017 1
123
Table 11: Number of EDPs (Opinion) per Country
Country Number of EDPs
1 Austria 1
2 Belgium 1
3 Bulgaria 1
4 Croatia 1
5 Cyprus 1
6 Czech Republic 1
7 Denmark 0
8 Finland 0
9 France 2
10 Germany 2
11 Greece 2
12 Hungary 0
13 Ireland 1
14 Italy 2
15 Latvia 1
16 Lithuania 1
17 Malta 3
18 Netherlands 1
19 Poland 1
20 Portugal 2
21 Romania 1
22 Slovakia 1
23 Slovenia 1
24 Spain 1
25 United Kingdom 1
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Table 12: Number of EDPs per Country (Report)
Country Number of EDPs
1 Austria 1
2 Belgium 0
3 Bulgaria 1
4 Croatia 1
5 Cyprus 1
6 Czech Republic 1
7 Denmark 0
8 Finland 2
9 France 2
10 Germany 2
11 Greece 1
12 Hungary 0
13 Ireland 1
14 Italy 3
15 Latvia 1
16 Lithuania 1
17 Malta 3
18 Netherlands 0
19 Poland 1
20 Portugal 2
21 Romania 1
22 Slovakia 1
23 Slovenia 1
24 Spain 1
25 United Kingdom 1
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Table 13: Number of EDPs (Opinion) per Year
Year Number of EDPs
1 2002 0
2 2003 2
3 2004 3
4 2005 2
5 2006 0
6 2007 0
7 2008 1
8 2009 18
9 2010 1
10 2011 0
11 2012 0
12 2013 2
13 2014 0
14 2015 0
15 2016 0
16 2017 0
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Table 14: Number of EDPs (Report) per Year
Year Number of EDPs
1 2002 1
2 2003 1
3 2004 3
4 2005 2
5 2006 0
6 2007 0
7 2008 1
8 2009 15
9 2010 1
10 2011 0
11 2012 0
12 2013 2
13 2014 1
14 2015 1
15 2016 1
16 2017 0
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics: Dependent and Independent Variables
EDP - Opinion EDP - Report Net Lending/Borrowing Debt
1 Min. :0.0000 Min. :0.0000 Min. :-32.000 Min. : 12.40
2 1st Qu.:0.0000 1st Qu.:0.0000 1st Qu.: -6.325 1st Qu.: 62.98
3 Median :0.0000 Median :0.0000 Median : -4.200 Median : 79.75
4 Mean :0.2014 Mean :0.2014 Mean : -5.325 Mean : 80.38
5 3rd Qu.:0.0000 3rd Qu.:0.0000 3rd Qu.: -3.400 3rd Qu.:100.42
6 Max. :1.0000 Max. :1.0000 Max. : 0.700 Max. :180.80
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Table 16: Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables (1)
Trust in European Commission Trust in nat. Government Positive Image of the EU
1 Min. :0.1703 Min. :0.08107 Min. :0.1620
2 1st Qu.:0.3699 1st Qu.:0.19003 1st Qu.:0.3168
3 Median :0.4562 Median :0.28799 Median :0.4041
4 Mean :0.4510 Mean :0.29502 Mean :0.4031
5 3rd Qu.:0.5489 3rd Qu.:0.37717 3rd Qu.:0.5045
6 Max. :0.6617 Max. :0.65000 Max. :0.6492
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables (2)
Relative Public Support Real GDP GDP Growth
1 Min. :-0.11223 Min. : 6.063 Min. :-14.80000
2 1st Qu.: 0.07333 1st Qu.: 156.957 1st Qu.: -1.10000
3 Median : 0.15894 Median : 328.575 Median : 0.75000
4 Mean : 0.15596 Mean : 971.039 Mean : 0.07222
5 3rd Qu.: 0.25681 3rd Qu.:1966.574 3rd Qu.: 1.80000
6 Max. : 0.40210 Max. :3752.366 Max. : 8.50000
Table 18: Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables (3)
Trust in European Commission ×
Real GDP
Relative Public Support ×
Real GDP
Positive Image of the EU ×
Real GDP
1 Min. : 3.577 Min. :-260.052 Min. : 2.739
2 1st Qu.: 74.276 1st Qu.: 8.218 1st Qu.: 50.211
3 Median : 170.478 Median : 44.508 Median : 137.646
4 Mean : 384.397 Mean : 110.891 Mean : 375.534
5 3rd Qu.: 662.600 3rd Qu.: 149.579 3rd Qu.: 662.494
6 Max. :1575.826 Max. : 665.686 Max. :1737.222
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables (4)
Trust in European Commission ×
GDP Growth
Relative Public Support ×
GDP Growth
Positive Image of the EU ×
GDP Growth
1 Min. :-7.25876 Min. :-4.77419 Min. :-6.67120
2 1st Qu.:-0.38979 1st Qu.:-0.16465 1st Qu.:-0.34128
3 Median : 0.29942 Median : 0.02324 Median : 0.28337
4 Mean : 0.09728 Mean :-0.02494 Mean : 0.08717
5 3rd Qu.: 0.78261 3rd Qu.: 0.25527 3rd Qu.: 0.75820
6 Max. : 5.19798 Max. : 2.62112 Max. : 5.38801
Table 20: Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables (5)
Powerful Member State Non-Compliance Eurozone Member
1 Min. :1.000 Min. : 1.00 Min. :1.000
2 1st Qu.:1.000 1st Qu.:11.00 1st Qu.:1.000
3 Median :1.000 Median :14.00 Median :2.000
4 Mean :1.319 Mean :13.33 Mean :1.743
5 3rd Qu.:2.000 3rd Qu.:16.00 3rd Qu.:2.000
6 Max. :2.000 Max. :22.00 Max. :2.000
Table 21: Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables (6)
Ex. Election Leg. Election Election
1 Min. :1.000 Min. :1.000 Min. :1.000
2 1st Qu.:1.000 1st Qu.:1.000 1st Qu.:1.000
3 Median :1.000 Median :1.000 Median :1.000
4 Mean :1.076 Mean :1.257 Mean :1.299
5 3rd Qu.:1.000 3rd Qu.:2.000 3rd Qu.:2.000
6 Max. :2.000 Max. :2.000 Max. :2.000
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11.3 Robustness Checks
11.3.1 Expected Values Simulation
Alternative Specification of Independent Variables
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Figure 43: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Trust in European
Commission and GDP Growth on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (GDP Growth = high)
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Figure 44: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Trust in European
Commission and GDP Growth on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (GDP Growth = low)
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Figure 45: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Relative Public Sup-
port and GDP Growth on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (GDP Growth = high)
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Figure 46: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Relative Public Sup-
port and GDP Growth on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (GDP Growth = low)
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Figure 47: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Positive Image of the
EU and Real GDP on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (Real GDP = high)
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Figure 48: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Positive Image of the
EU and Real GDP on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (Real GDP = low)
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Figure 49: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Positive Image of the
EU and GDP Growth on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (GDP Growth = high)
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Figure 50: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Positive Image of the
EU and GDP Growth on EDP (Opinion) Initiations (GDP Growth = low)
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Alternative Specification of Dependent Variable
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Figure 51: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Trust in European
Commission and Real GDP on EDP Initiations (Report) (Real GDP = high)
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Figure 52: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Trust in European
Commission and Real GDP on EDP Initiations (Report) (Real GDP = low)
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Figure 53: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Trust in European
Commission and GDP Growth on EDP Initiations (Report) (GDP Growth = high)
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Figure 54: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Trust in European
Commission and GDP Growth on EDP Initiations (Report) (GDP Growth = low)
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Figure 55: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Relative Public Sup-
port and Real GDP on EDP Initiations (Report) (Real GDP = high)
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Figure 56: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Relative Public Sup-
port and Real GDP on EDP Initiations (Report) (Real GDP = low)
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Figure 57: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Relative Public Sup-
port and GDP Growth on EDP Initiations (Report) (GDP Growth = high)
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Figure 58: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Relative Public Sup-
port and GDP Growth on EDP Initiations (Report) (GDP Growth = low)
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Figure 59: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Positive Image of the
EU and Real GDP on EDP Initiations (Report) (Real GDP = high)
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Figure 60: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Positive Image of the
EU and Real GDP on EDP Initiations (Report) (Real GDP = low)
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Figure 61: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Positive Image of the
EU and GDP Growth on EDP Initiations (Report) (GDP Growth = high)
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Figure 62: Expected Values for the Effect of the Interaction Between Positive Image of the
EU and GDP Growth on EDP Initiations (Report) (GDP Growth = low)
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11.3.2 Caterpillar Plots
Alternative Specification of Independent Variables
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Figure 63: Random Effects of Robustness Check IV (Model 3) (Trust in European Com-
mission × GDP Growth).
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(b) Year-Level Random Effects γt
Figure 64: Random Effects of Robustness Check IV (Model 4) (Relative Public Support ×
GDP Growth).
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Figure 65: Random Effects of Robustness Check IV (Model 5) (Positive Image of the EU
× Real GDP).
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Figure 66: Random Effects of Robustness Check IV (Model 6) (Positive Image of the EU
× GDP Growth).
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Alternative Specification of Dependent Variable
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Figure 67: Random Effects of Robustness Check DV (Alternative Specification for EDP
(Report); Model 7) (Trust in European Commission × Real GDP).
144
−4 −2 0 2 4 6
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lHungary
Netherlands
Belgium
Greece
Denmark
Lithuania
 Cyprus
Latvia
Portugal
Romania
Poland
Slovakia
Czech Republic
Ireland
Spain
Slovenia
France
Austria
Italy
Bulgaria
Germany
Croatia
United Kingdom
Malta
Finland
(a) Country-Level Random Effects αi
−4 −2 0 2 4
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l2003
2010
2013
2015
2016
2014
2012
2006
2005
2017
2002
2008
2004
2009
2011
2007
(b) Year-Level Random Effects γt
Figure 68: Random Effects of Robustness Check DV (Alternative Specification for EDP
(Report); Model 8) (Trust in European Commission × GDP Growth ).
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Figure 69: Random Effects of Robustness Check DV (Alternative Specification for EDP
(Report); Model 9) (Relative Public Support × Real GDP).
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Figure 70: Random Effects of Robustness Check DV (Alternative Specification for EDP
(Report); Model 10) (Relative Public Support × GDP Growth).
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Figure 71: Random Effects of Robustness Check DV (Alternative Specification for EDP
(Report); Model 11) (Positive Image of the EU × Real GDP).
148
−4 −2 0 2 4
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lHungary
Belgium
Netherlands
Greece
Ireland
Lithuania
Romania
Portugal
 Cyprus
Poland
Denmark
Slovenia
Latvia
Spain
Slovakia
Czech Republic
Bulgaria
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Germany
Austria
Croatia
Malta
Finland
(a) Country-Level Random Effects αi
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l2013
2003
2010
2015
2016
2014
2012
2006
2005
2017
2002
2004
2009
2008
2007
2011
(b) Year-Level Random Effects γt
Figure 72: Random Effects of Robustness Check DV (Alternative Specification for EDP
(Report); Model 12) (Positive Image of the EU × GDP Growth).
149
11.4 Model Diagnostics
11.4.1 Posterior Predictive Checking
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Figure 73: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 1: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 74: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 1: Standard Deviation
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Figure 75: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 2: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 76: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 2: Standard Deviation
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Figure 77: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 3: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 78: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 3: Standard Deviation
152
Mean
Replicated data
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
Figure 79: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 4: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 80: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 4: Standard Deviation
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Figure 81: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 5: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 82: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 5: Standard Deviation
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Figure 83: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 6: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 84: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 6: Standard Deviation
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Figure 85: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 7: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 86: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 7: Standard Deviation
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Figure 87: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 8: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 88: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 8: Standard Deviation
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Figure 89: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 9: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 90: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 9: Standard Deviation
158
Mean
Replicated data
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
Figure 91: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 10: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 92: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 10: Standard Deviation
159
Mean
Replicated data
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
Figure 93: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 11: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 94: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 11: Standard Deviation
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Figure 95: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 12: Mean
Standard Deviation
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Figure 96: Posterior Predictive Checking for Model 12: Standard Deviation
161
Table 22: Bayesian p-Values
Model Mean Standard Deviation
1 0.60 0.60
2 0.59 0.59
3 0.59 0.59
4 0.59 0.60
5 0.59 0.59
6 0.60 0.60
7 0.61 0.61
8 0.59 0.59
9 0.60 0.60
10 0.61 0.61
11 0.60 0.60
12 0.61 0.61
11.4.2 Deviance Information Criterion
Table 23: Deviance Information Criterion
Model DIC
1 99.17
2 102.05
3 101.63
4 103.04
5 98.19
6 97.29
7 130.14
8 125.18
9 147.87
10 129.36
11 136.50
12 131.54
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